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Setting the Standard:
A Critique of Bonnie's Competency
Standard and the Potential
of Problem-Solving Theory for
Self-Representation at Trial
E. Lea Johnston*
In Indiana v. Edwards, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Sixth
Amendment permits a trial court to impose a higher competency standard
for self-representation than to stand trial. The Court declined to specify
the contents of a permissible representational competence standard, but
cited with support the construct of adjudicative competence developed by
Professor Richard Bonnie. While Bonnie's proposal may provide an
appropriate framework for evaluating the competence of represented
defendants' decisions, it is at most a starting point for defining the
capacities needed for self-representation at trial. This Article begins by
exposing three reasons why Bonnie's approach is inadequate to address
self-representation. First, Bonnie selected the functional abilities necessary
for decisional competence only in reference to the norm of autonomy.
Second, Bonnie did not consider the unique decisionmaking context
presented by self-representation. Third, Bonnie derived the elements in his
decisional competence construct from the subset of abilities considered
necessary to consent to medical treatment. While many similarities exist
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between a represented defendant and a medical patient, this analogy does
not hold for unrepresented defendants forced to make decisions at trial
without an expert's assistance. Next, the Article - conceptualizing self-
representation as an exercise in problem solving, where the major
"problem" is the prosecution of a criminal charge - draws upon
psychological theories of problem solving to identify abilities necessary for
decisionmaking at trial. Applying a normative theory of representational
competence that balances concerns of autonomy, reliability, and fairness,
the Article concludes by suggesting a subset of abilities that may be critical
for self-representation at trial.
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INTRODUCTION
On April 22, 2002, Zacarias Moussaoui, the alleged twentieth
hijacker in the attacks of September 11, stood up in federal district
court and launched into a fifty-minute tirade against his attorneys, the
United States, and Israel.' Quoting extensively from the Koran in both
English and Arabic, he told Judge Leonie M. Brinkema that he wanted
to fire his court-appointed attorneys, represent himself, and hire a
Muslim lawyer as his legal consultant.2 He then prayed at length for
the destruction of the United States and Israel.3 Judge Brinkema, who
ordered a competency hearing, observed that Moussaoui "appear[ed]
to know and understand what the was] doing" and stated: "You are
very bright.... Unless the doctor comes up with something, I will
find this is a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel."4 On the basis
of four reports by mental health experts,' the observations of detention
center personnel, and the defendant's court appearances and written
motions, 6 Judge Brinkema found Moussaoui competent to stand trial.7
Assuming he was therefore competent to represent himself,8 Judge
l Brooke A. Masters, Moussaoui Wants to Be Own Lawyer; Suspect Also Denounces
U.S., Israel During Hearing, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 2002, at Al.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
Judge Brinkema appointed Dr. Raymond Patterson "to perform a forensic
competency evaluation of Zacarias Moussaoui to assist the Court in determining
whether the defendant is competent to make the decision to waive counsel, or whether
the decision is the product of a mental disease or defect rendering the decision
involuntary or without a knowing appreciation of its consequences." United States v.
Moussaoui, No. CRIM. 01-455-A, 2002 WL 1311729, at *1 (E.D. Va. Apr. 26, 2002).
Patterson met with Moussaoui briefly four times and submitted a preliminary report to
the court. Transcript of Motion Hearing Before the Honorable Leonie M. Brinkema at 3,
United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va. 2003) (No. CRIM. 01-
455 A), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/transcripts/
moussaoui061302.htm. In response, defense counsel retained two mental health
experts and tendered their views to the court. Id. at 3-4. Patterson then submitted a
more detailed supplemental report, based on a nearly two-hour interaction with
Moussaoui. Id. at 4. The defense filed a brief response to that report. Id.
6 Transcript of Motion Hearing Before the Honorable Leonie M. Brinkema, supra
note 5, at 3-4, 11-14.
Id. at 16 (finding Moussaoui competent under Dusky standard to stand trial).
B Id. at 46 ("1 don't need you to explain to me why you are making the decision to
represent yourself, why you do not want these attorneys to represent you any longer,
not for purposes of the Faretta [self-representation] evaluation. I don't need that, and
I've already indicated that I have found you competent. So there's no issue about your
competency.").
20101 1607
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Brinkema probed Moussaoui's understanding of the disadvantages of
self-representation 9 and found that he had effected a knowing and
intelligent waiver of the right to counsel.'l Moussaoui, who continued
to assert that his defense attorneys were conspiring to kill him, was
allowed to represent himself despite stern warnings from the judge,
who called the decision "unwise."'" Proceeding pro se, Moussaoui
filed questionable handwritten motions on an almost daily basis,
including two entitled "Stop Leonie Brinkema DJ Playing Game with
My Life" and "Keep Mad, Out of Control Standby Hord of Blood
Sucker, Out of Halal, Pure Pro Se Land."'12 Moussaoui also filed
pleadings which, according to one news report, included "veiled, and
in some cases overt, threats to public officials, attacks on foreign
governments, attempts to communicate with persons overseas and
efforts to obtain materials unrelated to this case."' 3 Other odd behavior
included insulting his standby counsel and calling Judge Brinkema a
"death judge," a "would-be Nazi SS officer,"' 4 and a "duplicitous 'she-
Clinton.' "15 Eventually, Judge Brinkema, having endured Moussaoui's
outbursts and insults, expressed that she had had enough. 6 The judge
issued an order in which she threatened to revoke Moussaoui's right to
represent himself if he continued to abuse it. 17 One of Moussaoui's
standby attorneys noted at that time: "We never thought he was
competent to defend himself .... We've always had concerns about his
mental health."'
' 8
9 Id. at 18-44.
10 Id. at 48 ("I'm satisfied that you understand what you are doing by waiving your
right to counsel, that you are doing so at this point for sufficiently rational reasons,
unwise but rational, and I'm going to make the finding that this is a valid waiver and
therefore allow you to proceed pro se."); see also United States v. Moussaoui, No.
CRIM. 01-455-A, 2002 WL 1311738, at *1 (E.D. Va. June 14, 2002) (granting
Moussaoui's motion to dismiss court-appointed counsel and proceed pro se).
" Tom Jackman, Moussaoui Allowed to Defend Himself, WASH. POST, June 14, 2002,
at Al.
12 Sarah Livingston Allen, Faretta: Self-Representation, or Legal-Misrepresentation?,
90 IowA L. REv. 1553, 1555 (2005).
13 Jerry Markon, Judge Blasts Moussaoui's Conduct; Terrorist Suspect Could Lose
Right to Represent Himself, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 2003, at A7.
14 Id.
'5 Jess Bravin, War on Terror's Thankless Task Is Legal Defense, WALL ST.J., July 25,
2002, at BI.
16 Markon, supra note 13, at BI.
17 Id.
18 Id. Based on Moussaoui's repeated violations of orders of the court, Judge
Brinkema finally found that Moussaoui had forfeited his right to represent himself and
ordered his standby counsel to once again serve as the attorneys of record. Jerry
[Vol. 43:16051608
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Pro se defendants of borderline mental competency, such as
Moussaoui, expose a fundamental tension between respecting the
autonomy of a defendant who wants to control his defense and
concerns over the fairness and reliability of the adjudication. Allowing
a "barking lunatic," 9 as one commentator described Moussaoui, to
control and conduct his defense at trial casts doubt on the accuracy of
a resulting conviction and the legitimacy of the criminal justice
system. At the same time, a defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to
represent himself at a criminal trial according to his own lights,20
despite the harm his defense likely will suffer.2
One possible means of addressing this tension would be to designate
some defendants as competent to proceed to trial only if represented.
In June 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court endorsed such an approach in
Indiana v. Edwards.2 In Edwards, the Supreme Court held that the
Sixth Amendment permits a trial court to impose a higher competency
standard for self-representation than to stand trial.23 The Court
declined to specify the elements of a permissible competency standard
for self-representation at trial (denominated in this Article as
"representational competence"), 2  but indicated that findings of
incompetence based on a lack of decisionmaking ability and severe
mental illness would withstand constitutional scrutiny. In support of a
statement that greater abilities may be required to present one's
defense than to stand trial with representation, the Edwards Court
cited with approval the construct for adjudicative competence
proposed by Professor Richard Bonnie.25
Markon, Lawyers Restored for Moussaoui, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2003, at A2.
'9 Jonathan Turley, A Fool and His Lawyer; Can You Be Competent to Stand Trial but
Unfit to Represent Yourself?, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2008, at A21.
20 See Elyn R. Saks, Competency to Refuse Treatment, 69 N.C. L. REV. 945, 950
(1991) (arguing that adequate "competency standard [must] protect a person's
expression of [eccentric] values and beliefs, however unconventional, because one
important purpose of competency doctrine is to allow people to pursue their interests
according to their own lights").
21 See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975).
22 128 S. Ct. 2379 (2008).
23 Id. at 2387-88.
24 The term "representational competence" is intended to capture those abilities
that a court should require a defendant to possess in order to represent himself at
trial. I do not address a defendant's competence to waive the right to counsel or to
plead guilty, either unrepresented or represented.
2 See Edwards, 128 S. Ct. at 2386-87 (citing N. POYTHRESS ET AL., ADJUDICATIVE
COMPETENCE: THE MACARTHUR STUDIES 103 (2002)).
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In a series of articles in the early 1990S,26 Bonnie suggested that
adjudicative competence - or competence to participate in one's
defense - should be disaggregated into two concepts: a foundational
concept of competence to assist counsel27 and a context-dependent
concept of decisional competence.28 Bonnie suggested that all
defendants must possess competence to assist counsel, while only
those defendants called on to make decisions during an adjudication
must possess decisional competence.29 Competence to assist counsel,
according to Bonnie, requires the abilities to understand the nature
and purpose of the criminal process, appreciate one's potential
jeopardy, and identify and communicate relevant information to
counsel.3 ° Decisional competence, on the other hand, includes those
abilities required for legally valid decisionmaking. 31 Bonnie proposed a
number of tests for decisional competence that vary by the decision at
issue and whether the defendant's decision is in accord with counsel's
advice.32 In order to waive counsel and proceed pro se, Bonnie argued
that a defendant should possess the ability to make reasoned choices.33
He defined this standard of decisional competence to include the
following functional elements: expression of choice, understanding of
factual information, appreciation of that information for the
defendant's own case, and rational manipulation of information.34 In
essence, Bonnie proposed that, to waive counsel, a defendant should
be capable of using logical processes to compare the benefits and risks
of options in a decisional framework free of delusional beliefs or
pathological emotions.35
Bonnie's construct for adjudicative competence rightly has been
much lauded by scholars for adding an important decisional element
26 See Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants: Beyond Dusky
and Drope, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 539 (1993) [hereinafter Bonnie, Beyond Dusky and
Dropel; Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants: A Theoretical
Reformulation, 10 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 291 (1992) [hereinafter Bonnie, A Theoretical
Reformulation]; Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants with Mental
Retardation to Participate in Their Own Defense, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 419
(1990) [hereinafter Bonnie, Mental Retardation].
27 See Bonnie, Beyond Dusky and Drope, supra note 26, at 554-55, 561-67.
8 See id. at 554-56, 567-87.
29 See id. at 548, 568.
30 Id. at 562-63.
31 Id. at 548.
32 See id. at 576-80.
31 See id. at 579. Bonnie acknowledged that self-representation at trial may require
additional abilities related to performance. See id. at 557 n.68.
34 See id. at 571-72.
" See id. at 574-75.
[Vol. 43:16051610
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to the competency analysis,36 but a close analysis of the underpinnings
and origin of the framework reveals its insufficiency for self-
representation at trial. Bonnie indicated his intent that his theory of
adjudicative competence should "embrace the full range of
competencies in the criminal process,"37 but he never considered
whether a defendant could be competent to waive the right to counsel
yet incompetent to represent himself at trial. Bonnie's core concern
involved a defendant's ability to make decisions while represented by
counsel. Competence for self-representation at trial, however, presents
a host of different challenges and calls for separate consideration.
Indeed, Bonnie recognized that self-representation at trial may require
additional abilities not included within his constructs of competence
to assist counsel and decisional competence.38
Bonnie's construct does not extend to representational competence
for three reasons. First, while his foundational concept of competence
to assist counsel protects the moral dignity of the judicial process and
the reliability of the adjudication,39 Bonnie identified only the norm of
defendant autonomy as important in selecting the functional abilities
necessary for decisional competence.' Recognizing the values of
36 See, e.g., John D. King, Candor, Zeal, and the Substitution of Judgment: Ethics and
the Mentally III Criminal Defendant, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 207, 232-33 (2008) (recognizing
that "[aIpproaching 'decisional competency' as the ability to make a rational choice on
a particular question in furtherance of a defense strategy is more nuanced and useful
than the unitary approach" that the Supreme Court adopted in Godinez v. Moran and
advocating for courts' adoption of Bonnie's basic rationality test, as modified by
Professors Christopher Slobogin and Amy Mashburn); Christopher Slobogin & Amy
Mashburn, The Criminal Defense Lawyer's Fiduciary Duty to Clients with Mental
Disability, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 1581, 1596-97 (2000) (characterizing Bonnie's
decisional competency hierarchy as "extremely helpful" in resolving the confusion
created by Godinez and allowing "sophisticated discussion of decisional competency
issues").
37 Bonnie, Beyond Dusky and Drope, supra note 26, at 560; see also Bonnie, A
Theoretical Reformulation, supra note 26, at 301.
38 See Bonnie, Beyond Dusky and Drope, supra note 26, at 557 n.68 ("The focus
here is only on the decisionmaking abilities required for effecting a legally valid waiver
of one's right to be represented by counsel in favor of self-representation, i.e., to
exercise one's 'Faretta right.' I am not referring to whatever performance abilities may
be required, in addition to decisional competence, for self-representation at a trial.").
9 See id. at 554-55.
4 See id. at 553, 556-57, 559-60. While Bonnie selected the components of his
decisional competence test with only the norm of autonomy in mind, he argues that
the ultimate decision of whether to allow a defendant to represent himself should take
into account other values, such as preserving the dignity of the proceeding. See
Richard J. Bonnie, Ferguson Spectacle Demeaned System, 17 NAT'I L.J., Mar. 13, 1995,
at A23 [hereinafter Bonnie, Ferguson] ("[Elven if he is competent to make this
decision [to represent himself at trial], a mentally ill defendant does not have an
20101 1611
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reliability and actual and apparent fairness, however, calls for
consideration of additional decisional abilities in the unique context of
self-representation. Second, because Bonnie generated his proposal
within the context of the few decisions allocated to a represented
criminal defendant, 41 his construct does not account for the unique
decisionmaking context of self-representation. When proceeding
without counsel at trial, a defendant is called upon to make a greater
number of decisions, of a greater variety, within a short period of time,
and without assistance. Third, Bonnie derived the elements in his
decisional competence construct from those identified as essential for
competence to consent to medical treatment.42 While many similarities
exist between a represented defendant and a medical patient, this
analogy does not hold for unrepresented defendants forced to make
decisions at trial without an expert's assistance. In essence, Bonnie's
construct implicitly assumes that a lawyer will identify a decision
point, distill relevant information, generate and analyze the utility of
potential options, and present a recommendation to the defendant. A
pro se defendant who proceeds to trial, however, will not have the
benefit of a lawyer's aid and must participate in all stages of the
decisionmaking and advocacy process. Therefore, self-representation
at trial implicates a broader range of cognitive abilities and
decisionmaking or problem-solving skills.
To identify additional abilities necessary for autonomous
decisionmaking at trial,4' this Article draws upon psychological
theories of problem solving. Self-representation is, at base, an exercise
absolute right to represent himself if allowing him to do so would undermine the
dignity of the trial process.").
4' See Bonnie, Beyond Dusky and Drope, supra note 26, at 553-54.
42 See id. at 570.
43 This Article will focus on decisionmaking abilities relevant to controlling one's
defense. Additional abilities may be necessary to conduct the defense. As I argue in a
follow-up piece, a person competent to make decisions regarding his defense should
be entitled to represent himself even if he lacks the performance or execution skills
necessary to conduct it. See E. Lea Johnston, Representational Competence: Defining the
Limits of the Right to Self-Representation at Trial, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REv. (forthcoming
2010) (manuscript at 54-55). In such situations, a court should appoint standby
counsel to effectuate the decisions of the defendant. See id. At least one court has
taken this tack, appointing standby counsel to carry out the strategic and tactical
decisions of a defendant with severe communication problems. See Savage v. Estelle,
924 F.2d 1459, 1466 (9th Cir. 1991). The appointment of standby counsel to perform
an execution function is one way to ensure that a defendant's constitutional right to
control his defense is impeded only to the extent necessary to protect the interests of
the State.
[Vol. 43:16051612
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in problem solving,4 where the major "problem" is the prosecution of
one or more criminal charges. Social problem-solving theory is one of
the earliest and most comprehensive prescriptive models of
decisionmaking. This theory, developed by Professors Marvin R.
Goldfried and Thomas D'Zurilla45 and refined by D'Zurilla and
Professor Arthur M. Nezu, 6 defines social problem solving as the self-
directed cognitive, affective, and behavioral process by which an
individual attempts to identify effective solutions for specific problems
encountered in the natural environment.47 D'Zurilla and his colleagues
understood the process, also called applied problem solving,4 as
conscious, rational, effortful, and purposeful.' They defined a
problem as "any life situation or task (present or anticipated) that
demands a response for adaptive functioning, but no effective
response is immediately apparent or available to the person
[confronted with the situation] due to the presence of [one or more]
obstacles."5 ° Obstacles may include novelty, ambiguity, performance
skill deficits, or lack of resources.5" The theory conceives of problem
solving as consisting of two domains: a motivational component called
problem orientation and four goal-directed, cognitive-behavioral
problem-solving skills. These skills include problem definition and
formulation, generation of alternative solutions, decisionmaking, and
solution implementation and verification. Requiring the possession of
" See generally Richard Zorza, Re-Conceptualizing the Relationship Between Legal
Ethics and Technological Innovation in Legal Practice: From Threat to Opportunity, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 2659, 2669-70 (1999) (describing how technology may assist clients
and attorneys in engaging in "detailed, multi-faceted diagnostic process" of problem
solving that is required to determine best way to proceed in given case).
41 See T. J. D'Zurilla & M.R. Goldfried, Problem Solving and Behavior Modification,
78J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 107, 107-20 (1971).
46 See THOMAS J. D'ZURILLA & ARTHUR NEZU, PROBLEM-SOLVING THERAPY: A SOCIAL
COMPETENCE APPROACH TO CLINICAL INTERVENTION 10-39 (Springer 2d ed. 1999)
[hereinafter D'ZURILLA & NEZU, PROBLEM-SOLVING THERAPY]; Thomas J. D'Zurilla &
Arthur Nezu, Social Problem Solving in Adults, in ADVANCES IN COGNITIVE-BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH AND THERAPY 201, 202-22 (PC Kendall ed., Academic Press 1982)
[hereinafter D'Zurilla & Nezu, Social Problem Solving in Adults].
47 See D'ZURILLA & NEZU, PROBLEM-SOLVING THERAPY, supra note 46, at 10; Thomas
J. D'Zurilla et al., Social Problem Solving: Theory and Assessment, in SOCIAL PROBLEM
SOLVING: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND TRAINING 11, 12 (E. Chang et al. eds., 2004).
48 Other terms used interchangeably with "social problem solving" include
interpersonal cognitive problem solving, personal problem solving, practical problem
solving, everyday problem solving, everyday cognition, and practical intelligence. See
D'ZURLLA & NEZU, PROBLEM-SOLVING THERAPY, supra note 46, at 10-11.
49 Id.
50 Id. at11.
"l D'Zurilla et al., supra note 47, at 13.
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at least a subset of these decisional components - widely viewed as
essential for optimal decisionmaking - may be appropriate as a
means to ensure that a defendant who wishes to proceed
unrepresented at trial is sufficiently capable of recognizing and
advancing his own interests.
This Article explores the implications of Edwards, exposes the
problems in applying Bonnie's construct to self-representation at trial,
and presents components of problem-solving theory for consideration
in an applicable standard. Part I discusses the facts, holding, and
rationales of Edwards, with an emphasis on decisionmaking abilities.
Part II introduces the adjudicative competence construct developed by
Bonnie and referenced by the Court in Edwards. Part III explains the
insufficiency and inapplicability of Bonnie's proposal for self-
representation at trial. Part IV outlines the decisional components of
social problem-solving theory. Part V presents a normative theory of
representational competence - which balances the competing
concerns of autonomy, reliability, and fairness - as a lens through
which to analyze the importance of each of these elements for self-
representation at trial. This Part finishes by proposing that, unless a
defendant's self-representation poses a grave threat to the reliability or
fairness of the proceeding, a defendant capable of autonomous
decisionmaking within the context of trial should be allowed to
control his defense. The Article concludes with a tentative proposal to
include a subset of problem-solving abilities in a representational
competence standard.
I. INDIANA V. EDWARDS
In July 1999, the State of Indiana charged Ahmad Edwards with
theft, criminal recklessness, aggravated battery, and attempted
murder.52 Over the course of the next four years, the trial court
ordered numerous competency evaluations and held three competency
hearings.53 Appointed and retained neuropsychiatrists diagnosed
Edwards with a "delusional disorder grandiose type"54  and
schizophrenia.55 Their reports documented that Edwards was often
52 Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 2382 (2008); see also Joint Appendix at la,
Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379 (No. 07-208), 2008 WL 906153 [hereinafter Edwards Joint
Appendix].
13 Edwards, 128 S. Ct. at 2382; see also Edwards Joint Appendix, supra note 52, at
106a-15a, 202a-03a.
54 Edwards Joint Appendix, supra note 52, at 21a, 26a-27a.
'5 Id. at 164a.
[Vol. 43:16051614
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"confused,"56 was "quite tangential, expansive, and disorganized in his
verbal output,"57 and presented "impairments of disorganized thought
processes, delusional ideation, and bothersome hallucinations. 5 8 The
trial court twice found Edwards incompetent to stand trial.59 At one
hearing, Edwards described his deficiencies in this way: "I guess I, it's
hard for me to communicate with anybody. I just, I'm not, I can't
concentrate, I come out of concentration so easy. It's just not, nothing
makes sense when I do, you know."'  In late 2003, the trial court
ordered Edwards into the custody of the Indiana Department of
Mental Health for evaluation and treatment.6"
Upon receiving antipsychotic medication and psychotherapy,62
Edwards's cognitive, communicative, and behavioral abilities
improved.63 In July 2004, a staff forensic psychiatrist reported that
Edwards's "thought processes are no longer disorganized"'  and that
"[tihere is no evidence of present or recent hallucinations. "65 The
doctor found that Edwards "communicates very well," "[h]is speech is
easy to understand," and "his thought processes are coherent."66 On
56 Id. at 28a.
57 Id. at 30a.
58 Id. at 221a. The Court in Edwards reported that the defendant had "serious
thinking difficulties and delusions." Edwards, 128 S. Ct. at 2382. The evidence
reflected that, consistent with his untreated mental illness, Edwards's functioning
varied over time. Compare Edwards Joint Appendix, supra note 52, at 61a-62a
(reporting in March 2001 that Edwards "appears able to think clearly" and "to carry
on a normal conversation and answer questions appropriately"), with id. at 164a
(reporting in November 2002 that Edwards's "thought process is markedly impaired
with loose associations, illogic, irrelevance, and marked incoherence").
59 Edwards was found incompetent to stand trial in August 2000, see Edwards, 128
S. Ct. at 2382; Edwards Joint Appendix, supra note 52, at 365a, and in November
2003, see Edwards Joint Appendix, supra note 52, at 206a-lla. Edwards had been
found competent to stand trial in April 2002. Edwards Joint Appendix, supra note 52,
at 106a-14a.
60 Edwards Joint Appendix, supra note 52, at 505a.
61 See Edwards, 128 S. Ct. at 2382; Edwards Joint Appendix, supra note 52, at
206a-1la. This was Edwards's second commitment to the Indiana Department of
Mental Health for evaluation and treatment. See Edwards Joint Appendix, supra note
52, at 48a-49a. He had been held at Logansport State Hospital for three months but
apparently received no therapy or medication (except Benadryl) during his stay. See
id. at 56a, 61a, ll0a.
62 See Edwards Joint Appendix, supra note 52, at 216a, 230a.
63 See id. at 230a-32a; see also id. at 165a (indicating that Edwards's competence
restoration was impossible without medication).
4 Id. at 23 La.
65 Id. at 232a.
66 Id.
20101 1615
HeinOnline  -- 43 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1615 2009-2010
University of California, Davis
the basis of this report, the trial court found Edwards competent to
stand trial.67 In June 2005, Edwards proceeded to trial with the
assistance of counsel. 6 A jury convicted Edwards of theft and criminal
recklessness, but was unable to reach agreement on the battery and
attempted murder counts.69
Prior to retrial, Edwards petitioned the court to proceed pro se.70
Edwards explained that he and his attorney disagreed as to which
defense to present to the attempted murder charge. 71 Edwards preferred
a self-defense theory, while his attorney wanted to argue lack of intent
to kill.72 The trial court, while satisfied that Edwards was waiving his
right to counsel knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, 73 denied
Edwards's motion.74 The court explained its reasoning in this way:
I spent some time going over [the reports of numerous doctors
who had evaluated Edwards's competency and mental
health] .... Each and every report where a... neurological
exam was performed found either delusions, a delusional
disorder of the grandiose type or schizophrenia of an
67 See id. at 226a-36a; Brief for Petitioner at 8, Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379
(2008) (No. 07-208), 2008 WL 336303 [hereinafter Edwards Brief for Petitioner].
6 Edwards, 128 S. Ct. at 2382. Immediately before the start of trial, Edwards
asked to proceed pro se. Edwards Joint Appendix, supra note 52, at 509a. Edwards
expressed concern that his appointed attorney had not devoted sufficient time to
reviewing his case and had limited Edwards's access to trial materials. Id. at 509a-10a.
The court found that Edwards had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to
counsel, id. at 512a, but denied his request to proceed pro se because allowing
Edwards to proceed on his desired defense (insanity) would have required a
continuance, id. at 515a, 520a, 524a. This decision was not at issue on appeal.
69 Edwards, 128 S. Ct. at 2382.
70 Id. at 2382-83; Edwards Joint Appendix, supra note 52, at 279a-82a, 522a.
71 Edwards Joint Appendix, supra note 52, at 523a. In Edwards's words: "My
objection is me and my attorney actually had discussed a defense, I think prosecution
had mentioned that, and we are in disagreement with it. He has a defense and I have a
defense that I would like to represent or present to the Judge." Id.
72 Id. at 525a. Edwards's attorney explained: "What [Edwards has] indicated to me
is that were he to proceed to trial, representing himself, that his defense would be self-
defense. He is prepared to go forward with that defense on his own today. That is not
the defense that I would be intending to advance to the jury in this case. And for the
record, as his counsel, and I really haven't wavered from this since I first became
familiar with this case, I believe that the defense that would be most in Mr.
Edwards'[s] interests to be advanced at trial would be basically that he didn't intend to
kill anybody .. " Id.
73 See Edwards Brief for Petitioner, supra note 67, at 3; Edwards Joint Appendix,
supra note 52, at 512a-27a.
" See Edwards Brief for Petitioner, supra note 67, at 3; Edwards Joint Appendix,
supra note 52, at 527a.
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undifferentiated type .... Several of the reports refer to
rambling writings as an indication of an inability to stay
focused. The report upon which we relied in finding that Mr.
Edwards was competent ... still found that there was
schizophrenia of an undifferentiated type; found that Mr.
Edwards acknowledged his need for counsel; found that Mr.
Edwards was able to plan a legal strategy in cooperation with
his attorney .... I'm going to carve out a third exception [to
the right to self-representation] .... I think it requires abilities
that exclude the doctors' findings, if you will. With these
findings, he's competent to stand trial[,] but I'm not going to
find he's competent to defend himself. So the request to
proceed pro se will be denied.75
The court appointed counsel to represent Edwards over his objection.
At retrial, Edwards's attorney pursued the line of defense that Edwards
had rejected. 6 On December 19, 2005, the jury convicted Edwards of
the remaining counts,77 and the court sentenced him to thirty years in
prison.78
Edwards appealed his conviction to Indiana's intermediate appellate
court.79 He argued that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment
right to self-representation when it refused to permit him to represent
himself at his retrial. Citing U.S. Supreme Court precedent, Edwards
asserted that the standard for competence to waive the right to counsel
is identical to that for competence to stand trial.8' Edwards argued
that, because the trial court found him competent to stand trial under
Dusky v. United States, he was necessarily competent to represent
himself."1 Dusky had established that a defendant is competent to
stand trial when he "has sufficient present ability to consult with his
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding" and has "a
rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against
him."'82 Courts have interpreted this standard to require that a
" Edwards Joint Appendix, supra note 52, at 526a-27a; see also Edwards v. State,
854 N.E.2d 42, 47-48 (Ind. App. 2006).
76 Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 2390 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
77 Edwards Brief for Petitioner, supra note 67, at 4.
78 Id.; see also Edwards, 128 S. Ct. at 2383.
79 See Edwards, 854 N.E.2d at 44.
80 Edwards v. State, 866 N.E.2d 252, 255 (Ind. 2007).
8' See id.
82 Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam); see also Drope
v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) ("It has long been accepted that a person whose
mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and
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defendant be able to identify and convey relevant information to
counsel, appreciate his status as a defendant in a criminal prosecution,
and understand the charges, the purpose of the criminal process, and
the purpose of the adversary system, including the role played by
defense counsel. 83 The appellate court agreed with Edwards, finding
that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Godinez v. Moran84
prohibited a state from imposing a higher competency standard for a
defendant to represent himself than to stand trial with the assistance
of counsel.85 The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed on that basis.86 At
Indiana's request, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The U.S. Supreme Court vacated and remanded, holding that the
Sixth Amendment87 permits a trial court to require a defendant to meet
object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in
preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial.").
83 See Bonnie, Beyond Dusky and Drope, supra note 26, at 554 & nn.62-64. After
Godinez, the Dusky standard may also require the capacity to understand the rights to
silence, jury trial, confrontation, and trial counsel. Slobogin & Mashburn, supra note
36, at 1590.
84 509 U.S. 389 (1993). In Godinez, the defendant, who had initially pleaded not
guilty in the shooting deaths of three people and was found competent to stand trial,
later informed the trial court that he wished to discharge his attorneys and change his
pleas to guilty in order to prevent the presentation of mitigating evidence at his
sentencing. Id. at 391-92. The trial court determined that the defendant had made an
intelligent and knowing waiver of his constitutional right to assistance of counsel and
accepted his guilty plea. Id. at 392. In responding to the defendant's subsequent
habeas petition, the district court affirmed the trial court's findings, but the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. Id. at 393. The Ninth Circuit held that the
competency to waive constitutional rights "requires a higher level of mental
functioning than that required to stand trial," and that a defendant is competent to
waive counsel or plead guilty only if he has the ability to make a "'reasoned choice'
among the alternatives available to him." Id. at 394. The United States Supreme Court
disagreed, stating that it "reject[ed] the notion that competence to plead guilty or to
waive the right to counsel must be measured by a standard that is higher than (or even
different from) the Dusky standard." Id. at 398.
85 See Edwards v. State, 854 N.E.2d 42, 48 (Ind. App. 2006).
86 See Edwards v. State, 866 N.E.2d 252, 260 (Ind. 2007).
87 The majority identifies the Sixth Amendment as the constitutional basis for its
decision in Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 2381, 2383-84 (2008), but its
emphasis on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding suggests that its holding was
motivated by due process concerns. See id. at 2387, 2388. The text of the Edwards
decision, with the exception of its discussion of Faretta, generally refers to the
requirements of "the Constitution." See id. at 2381, 2383, 2385. The Court's reliance
on Dusky and Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975), which held that the Due Process
Clause prohibits the trial of an incompetent defendant, see id. at 172, as support for
the notion that the self-representation right may be limited by mental competency also
suggests due process origins in Edwards. See Edwards, 128 S. Ct. at 2383, 2386-87
(discussing relationship of Dusky/Drope standard to case at bar). In his dissent, Justice
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a higher threshold of competency to represent himself than to stand
trial or effect a valid waiver of counsel.' The Court invoked several
strands of reasoning to support its holding. First, the Court found that
precedent89 "point[ed] slightly in the direction of" its holding." In
particular, the Court observed that Dusky's mental competency
standard focused on a defendant's "present ability to consult with his
lawyer," thus emphasizing the centrality of representation to the
competency inquiry. 9' Second, the Court found that the varying nature
of mental illness called for applying a different mental competency
standard to different activities." Referencing the ebb and flow of
Edwards's lucidity, the Court observed, "In certain instances an
individual may well be able to satisfy Dusky's mental competence
standard, for he will be able to work with counsel at trial, yet at the
same time he may be unable to carry out the basic tasks needed to
present his own defense without the help of counsel."93 Third, the
Court asserted that allowing a borderline-competent defendant to
represent himself would not be respectful of his autonomy because the
representation could result in a "humiliating" spectacle.94 Finally, the
Court found its holding consistent with the government's interests in
securing a reliable verdict and an actual - and apparent - fair trial. 95
Scalia notes that the right to self-representation may be understood to stem from the
Due Process Clause in addition to the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 2390-91 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); see also Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist., 528
U.S. 152, 165 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
" Edwards, 128 S. Ct. at 2387-88.
89 The Court found that Faretta and Godinez, while relevant, were not controlling.
See id. at 2384-85 (analyzing applicability of Faretta and Godinez). Faretta did not
consider the issue of competency. See id. at 2384. Godinez, which, like Edwards,
involved a "borderline-competent criminal defendant," held that the Sixth
Amendment does not require a defendant to satisfy a higher mental competency
standard to represent himself than to stand trial. See id. at 2384-85. Godinez did not
address, however, whether the Constitution allows a trial court to impose a higher
competency standard. Id. at 2385. Additionally, Godinez involved a defendant who
sought to proceed pro se to enter a plea of guilty, not to go to trial. Id.
90 Id. at 2386.
9' Id. (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam)); see
also id. (quoting Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975)). The Court also
referenced Faretta's partial reliance on preexisting state laws, all of which were
consistent with a competency requirement for self-representation. See id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 2387.
95 Id. ("Moreover, insofar as a defendant's lack of capacity threatens an improper
conviction or sentence, self-representation in that exceptional context undercuts the
most basic of the Constitution's criminal law objectives, providing a fair trial. ...
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The U.S. Supreme Court left to lower courts the task of crafting a
specific competency standard for self-representation, but its opinion in
Edwards provides guidance for identifying capacities and skills
relevant to such a standard. In particular, the Court evidenced concern
for a defendant's "mental condition"96 or "mental fitness."97 While
these terms are undefined, they appear to capture, at least in part,
elements of adjudicative competence, or powers of understanding,
reasoning, and appreciation of charges. 8 The Court indicated its belief
that a defendant requires greater decisionmaking powers to represent
himself at trial than to assist counsel.99 The Court also repeatedly
highlighted the importance of a defendant's expressive ability or
communication skills. 100 It is unclear whether poor communication
skills on their own, however, could support a finding of
representational incompetence, or whether such evidence is merely
important as an indicator of disorganized thinking.'0 ' Finally, the
Further, proceedings must not only be fair, they must appear fair to all who observe
them." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
96 Id. at 2385.
91 See id. The Court also used the terms "mental capacity," see id. at 2385, 2387,
and "mental competency," see id. at 2383, 2384, 2386.
98 The Court, in a parenthetical, quoted a passage from a 2002 study that states,
"Within each domain of adjudicative competence (competence to assist counsel;
decisional competence) the data indicate that understanding, reasoning, and
appreciation [of the charges against a defendant] are separable and somewhat
independent aspects of functional legal ability." Id. at 2386-87 (citing and quoting N.
POYTHRESS ET AL., ADJUDICATIVE COMPETENCE: THE MACARTHUR STUDIES 103 (2002)).
99 See id.
o See id. at 2387 (citing "impaired expressive abilities" as impeding defendant's
ability to represent himself and drawing readers' attention to rambling, nonsensical
motions and documents filed by Edwards); id. at 2388-89 (referencing motion drafted
by Edwards and including excerpt of motion in appendix of opinion). In prior cases,
the Court has found that a defendant's ability to communicate effectively may factor
into whether the Due Process Clause requires appointment of counsel. See Gagnon v.
Scarpellli, 411 U.S. 778, 790-91 (1973) (involving probation hearing).
'0' Indiana urged the Court to adopt a standard that would allow trial courts to
"deny a criminal defendant the right to represent himself at trial where the defendant
cannot communicate coherently with the court or a jury." Edwards, 128 S. Ct. at 2388
(quoting Edwards Brief for Petitioner, supra note 67, at 20 (emphasis omitted)).
Indiana's communication-based standard would not require a finding of decisional
incompetence or even a finding of mental illness. See Edwards Brief for Petitioner,
supra note 67, at 26. While it did not adopt the standard, the Court did not criticize it
as being incomplete or constitutionally impermissible. Instead, the Court merely
voiced uncertainty as to how the standard would operate in practice. Edwards, 128 S.
Ct. at 2388. Because the legal response to a finding of representational incompetence
involves appointing an attorney to serve as a surrogate decisionmaker, see id. at 2390,
2394 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (highlighting fact that, after Edwards's pro se request was
denied, his lawyer advanced defense that defendant had explicitly rejected), decisional
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Court, in passing, listed the following conditions as impeding a
defendant's ability to represent himself: "[dlisorganized thinking,
deficits in sustaining attention and concentration,. . . anxiety, and
other common symptoms of severe mental illnesses.' 1
0 2
In Edwards the U.S. Supreme Court encouraged trial courts to "take
realistic account of the particular defendant's mental capacities by
asking whether a defendant who seeks to conduct his own defense at
trial is mentally competent to do so."' 0' 3 While the Court abstained
from speculating about the constitutional permissibility of any
particular standard, its opinion suggested that decisional competence
is a relevant, if not essential, component of representational
competence. 1  The term "decisional competence" was coined by
Professor Bonnie in the context of his proposal for a dual standard of
adjudicative competence, and the Court in Edwards cited this
construct with approval. 10 5  While Bonnie did not address
representational competence directly, 106 his construct suggests that, to
be allowed to proceed pro se, a defendant should possess not only the
capacities to understand and attend to the proceedings, but also the
abilities to express a choice, understand and appreciate information
bearing on decisions, and reason.0 7 Close analysis of Bonnie's
approach, however, demonstrates that it does not fully and adequately
address the abilities required for self-representation.
II. PROFESSOR RICHARD BONNIE'S CONSTRUCT OF ADJUDICATIVE
COMPETENCE
The U.S. Supreme Court in Edwards indicated its support of
Bonnie's adjudicative competence framework. After referencing "the
basic tasks needed to present his own defense without the help of
counsel," the Court alluded to the importance of competence to assist
counsel and decisional competence and cited with approval the
competency construct delineated in Adjudicative Competence: The
competence should be an essential component of representational competence.
102 Edwards, 128 S. Ct. at 2387 (quoting Brief for the American Psychiatric
Association et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 26, Edwards, 128 S.
Ct. 2379 (No. 07-208), 2008 WL 405546).
103 Id. at 2387-88.
104 See id. at 2386-87.
105 See id.
106 See Bonnie, Beyond Dusky and Drope, supra note 26, at 557 n.68.
107 See id. at 571-72; id. at 560 ("These . . . concepts [of competence to assist
counsel and decisional competence] seem to embrace the full range of competencies
in the criminal process.").
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MacArthur Studies.'0 8 This work, the culmination of research
conducted by the MacArthur Foundation Research Network on
Mental Health and the Law, draws upon Professor Bonnie's theoretical
framework for competency to stand trial.'°9
Bonnie made a valuable contribution to the legal competency
literature by defining "the meaning of incompetence [in criminal
adjudication] in relation to the social purposes that the rules are
designed to serve" and disaggregating the competence necessary to
participate in one's defense into two separate constructs." Bonnie
identified three independent values implicated by barring adjudication
on grounds of incompetence: the moral dignity of the judicial process,
the reliability of the adjudication, and a defendant's autonomy interest
in being able to make certain decisions relating to his defense."'
Bonnie constructed a competency model responsive to these norms by
separating adjudicative competence into a foundational concept of
competence to assist counsel" 2 and a context-dependent concept of
decisional competence." 3 While all defendants should be competent to
assist counsel as a threshold matter, a defendant need only be
decisionally competent to make one of the several decisions allocated
to him in the criminal process." 4 These decisions include whether to
plead guilty," 5 waive the right to a jury trial," 6 waive the right to
counsel, 1 7 testify,"8 and be present at trial." 9
Competence to assist counsel, as understood by Bonnie,
operationalizes the Dusky standard for competence to stand trial.
Bonnie theorized that this foundational concept, which does not
encompass decisionmaking abilities, serves the interests of dignity and
reliability by ensuring, respectively, that a defendant is a "fit" subject
for prosecution and that he is capable of recognizing and relaying
101 Edwards, 128 S. Ct. at 2386-87 (quoting N. POYTHRESS ET AL., ADJUDICATIVE
COMPETENCE: THE MACARTHUR STUDIES 103 (2002)).
109 N. POYTHRESS ET AL., ADJUDICATIVE COMPETENCE: THE MACARTHUR STUDIES 56-57
(2002) (describing Bonnie's conceptual model).
110 Bonnie, Beyond Dusky and Drope, supra note 26, at 541.
"' See id. at 551-54; Bonnie, Mental Retardation, supra note 26, at 426-28.
112 See Bonnie, Beyond Dusky and Drope, supra note 26, at 554-55, 561-67.
113 See id. at 554-56, 567-87.
114 See id. at 545, 568.
"l See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969).
116 Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 278 (1942).
117 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975).
I" Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51-53 (1987);Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751
(1983) (dictum).
19 Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 418 n.24 (1988) (dictum).
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relevant information to counsel. 120 Bonnie defined competence to
assist counsel to include "an actual understanding of the nature and
purpose of the criminal process, appreciation of one's own situation as
a criminal defendant, and a capacity to recognize and relate relevant
information to the attorney."'' He argued that the stringency of this
standard in application should vary by "the complexity of the charges
and the attorney's actual need for information." "12 A finding of
incompetence in this domain precludes adjudication. 12 3
Decisional competence, on the other hand, serves the interest of
autonomy and is required only in those few instances in which a
defendant must make a decision in the context of his adjudication. 124
After surveying the scarce relevant case law, Bonnie suggested that the
test for decisional competence should vary according to the particular
decisionmaking context at issue."' Bonnie used the abilities identified
by Professors Thomas Grisso and Paul S. Appelbaum in their work in
medical treatment decisionmaking as a "starting point" for
determining potential capacities necessary for criminal adjudication. 126
In order to make competent medical decisions, Grisso and Appelbaum
had proposed that patients should possess the capacity to
communicate a choice, understand relevant information, appreciate
the nature of the medical situation and its likely consequences, and
manipulate information rationally. 127 Bonnie assessed the applicability
of each of these abilities for decisional competence in a criminal
proceeding by surveying its relationship to the standards alluded to in
the case law and to the norms of dignity, reliability, and autonomy. 
28
120 See Bonnie, Beyond Dusky and Drope, supra note 26, at 554-55; Bonnie, Mental
Retardation, supra note 26, at 426-28, 430-31.
121 Bonnie, Beyond Dusky and Drope, supra note 26, at 562-63.
122 Id. at 561.
123 Id. at 554.
124 Id.
125 See id.; Bonnie, A Theoretical Reformulation, supra note 26, at 305-14.
126 Bonnie, Beyond Dusky and Drope, supra note 26, at 570 & n.IlI (citing Paul S.
Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso, Assessing Patients' Capacities to Consent to Treatment,
319 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1635 (1988)); Bonnie, A Theoretical Reformulation, supra note
26, at 305; see also Bonnie, Mental Retardation, supra note 26, at 435 & n.64. For a
short synopsis of Grisso's and Appelbaum's construct for competency to make medical
decisions, see THOMAS GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES: FORENSIC ASSESSMENTS AND
INSTRUMENTS 398-400 (2d ed. 2003).
127 See Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso, The MacArthur Treatment Competence
Study, I: Mental Illness and Competence to Consent to Treatment, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
105, 109-11 (1995) [hereinafter Appelbaum & Grisso, The MacArthur Treatment
Competence Study].
1 See Bonnie, Beyond Dusky and Drope, supra note 26, at 572-76.
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Ultimately, Bonnie suggested five tests of varying degrees of
stringency, which could be applied to different decisions.' 29 These
tests include, from least to most stringent, expression of preference,
30
basic understanding,' 3 1 minimum appreciation or basic rationality,
132
substantial appreciation, 133 and reasoned choice.
1 34
Bonnie's least stringent test of decisional competence, expression of
preference, includes the ability to express a choice among alternatives
and to maintain a stable preference. 3 5 The understanding test captures
a defendant's comprehension of the parameters of options related to a
particular decision, including his prerogatives as a decisionmaker.1
36
Bonnie's decisional competence framework includes two levels of
appreciation, or a defendant's ability to appreciate the significance of
information for his own case.'37 The element of minimum appreciation
assesses the plausibility of the reasons underlying a decision, 38 while
substantial appreciation evaluates the rationality of the defendant's
belief system.'39 The latter element serves to exclude cases of gross
irrationality and decisions "powerfully influenced by delusional beliefs
or pathological emotions."" Finally, the test of reasoned choice
includes the capacity to seek relevant information to inform the
decision and to use "logical processes" to compare the benefits and
disadvantages of the options.'4 ' The element of reasoning evaluates a
defendant's ability to apply logic, distinguish legally relevant from
irrelevant information, and make correct inferences and deductions.1
42
129 See id. at 571-76. Professor Terry A. Maroney has proposed a modified test for
decisional competence, which includes elements of perception, understanding,
reasoning, and choice. See Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Competence, "Rational
Understanding," and the Criminal Defendant, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1375, 1392 (2006).
130 See Bonnie, Beyond Dusky and Drope, supra note 26, at 572.
' See id. at 572-73.
132 See id. at 573-74.
131 See id. at 574-75.
134 See id. at 575-76.
135 See id. at 572.
136 See POYTHRESS ET AL., supra note 109, at 60, 65-66 (analyzing "understanding" in
context of decisions to plead guilty and waive right to jury trial). Generally speaking, a
defendant's performance on understanding lines of inquiry primarily measures his prior
exposure to, and memory for, legally relevant information. Id. at 136.
131 See Bonnie, Beyond Dusky and Drope, supra note 26, at 573.
" See id. at 574.
139 POYTHRESS ET AL., supra note 109, at 60, 64, 67.
See Bonnie, Beyond Dusky and Drope, supra note 26, at 575.
141 See id. at 575-76; see also POYTHRESS ET AL., supra note 109, at 60, 66-67.
142 See POYTHRESS ET AL., supra note 109, at 136.
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While, as an empirical matter, the abilities do not form a hierarchy'
of rigor, 43 each of Bonnie's decisional tests subsumes the elements of
the less stringent test before it.144 When the context of a decision
indicates that a choice is likely to be unreliable - such as when a
defendant rejects his counsel's advice and insists on waiving his right
to counsel and representing himself - Bonnie suggested that the most
stringent decisional competency standard, reasoned choice, should
apply. 145 The reasoned choice test includes the five functional abilities
identified briefly above: expression of preference, factual
understanding, minimum appreciation, substantial appreciation, and
reasoned choice. 146 Bonnie argued that a finding of decisional
incompetence should not preclude adjudication and suggested
surrogate decisionmaking by counsel as a means to overcome
decisional deficiencies.
147
Bonnie's decisional competence construct has been widely lauded
within the academic community."' While some commentators have
offered amendments to Bonnie's proposal, 49 none have questioned the
propriety of using the construct as the conceptual framework for
adjudicative competence, even within the context of self-
representation at trial. 150 An analysis of the origins of the construct,
' See Thomas Grisso & Paul S. Appelbaum, Comparison of Standards for Assessing
Patients' Capacities to Make Treatment Decisions, 152 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1033, 1035-37
(1995); R. J. Gurrera et al., Cognitive Performance Predicts Treatment Decisional
Abilities in Mild to Moderate Dementia, 66 NEUROLOGY 1367, 1370 (2006).
1 See Bonnie, Beyond Dusky and Drope, supra note 26, at 571.
145 See id. at 579, 586.
146 See id. at 572-76.
117 See id. at 579-80.
1 4 See, e.g., King, supra note 36, at 233 (noting that adoption of Bonnie's proposal
would lead to more accurate determinations of which criminal defendants are
competent "to meaningfully take part in [their] defense"); Slobogin & Mashburn,
supra note 36, at 1596-97 ("Bonnie's decisional competency framework is extremely
helpful. First, it resolves the confusion created by Godinez and the cases leading up to
it, which failed to distinguish between assistance and decisional competency. Second,
its competency hierarchy allows sophisticated discussion of decisional competency
issues.").
149 See Maroney, supra note 129, at 1391-92 & n.97 (reordering and slightly
changing emphasis of components of Bonnie's decisional competence construct);
Slobogin & Mashburn, supra note 36, at 1594-98 (rejecting Bonnie's components of
substantial appreciation and reasoning as insufficiently deferential to autonomy and
adding element of "basic self-regard").
150 See Christopher Slobogin, Mental Illness and Self-Representation: Faretta,
Godinez and Edwards, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 391, 402-03 (2009) (arguing that, to
waive one's right to counsel and to represent oneself at trial, one should possess "basic
rationality," as defined by Bonnie, and "basic self-regard").
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however, reveals its incompatibility with self-representation. In
particular, the normative underpinnings and factual context
underlying Bonnie's decisional competence proposal suggest its
limited applicability to the very different context of self-
representation.
Ill. INSUFFICIENCY OF BONNIE'S CONSTRUCT FOR REPRESENTATIONAL
COMPETENCE
While it may be appropriate to require pro se defendants to possess
certain abilities included in Bonnie's adjudicative competence
construct, the construct is not a proper or sufficient measure of
representational competence. Three aspects of Bonnie's construct
account for its inapplicability. First, while Bonnie's foundational
concept of competence to assist counsel promotes the reliability of the
adjudication and protects the moral dignity of the criminal process,15'
Professor Bonnie identified relevant functional abilities of decisional
competence only in reference to the norm of autonomy.152 As Edwards
made clear, representational competence serves to respect the
autonomy of the defendant while safeguarding the reliability of the
proceeding and the actual and apparent fairness of the adjudication.
The cognitive and decisional components of a representational
competence standard, therefore, should balance concern for respecting
a defendant's autonomy with preventing grave threats to accuracy or
fairness. Second, Bonnie originally defined decisional competence
within the context of the handful of decisions entrusted to represented
criminal defendants.' The context in which these decisions are made
differs significantly from that which pro se defendants encounter at
trial. Third, Bonnie derived his decisional competence construct
wholly from the model for competence to consent to medical
treatment. 54 Informed consent may provide an apt analogy for
proceeding to trial with counsel, because in both situations the
individual must merely respond to the advice of an expert. In the
context of self-representation, however, a defendant will not have the
benefit of an expert's assistance. Pro se defendants must therefore
possess a greater array of problem-solving abilities to manage a
criminal trial alone.
l~' See Bonnie, Beyond Dusky and Drope, supra note 26, at 554-55.
152 See id. at 553, 556-57, 559-60.
'5 See id. at 554.
See id. at 570.
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A. Failure to Deal Squarely with Reliability and Fairness Concerns
Decisional competence, as defined by Bonnie, serves to safeguard
the interest of autonomous decisionmaking by the defendant.155
Bonnie identified decisional competence as "an inherent, though
derivative, feature of any legal doctrine that prescribes a norm of client
autonomy.""5 6 Flowing from this precept, Bonnie identified as crucial
only those abilities recognized by psychologists in other contexts as
necessary for autonomous decisionmaking.'57  These abilities,
described previously, include expression of choice, understanding,
appreciation, and reasoning.'58 Bonnie acknowledged that preserving
moral dignity and protecting against erroneous convictions are also
important values at stake in a criminal adjudication.'59 In his view,
however, correct application of the Dusky standard usually 6' protects
these norms by ensuring that the defendant is a "fit" subject for
prosecution and is capable of identifying and conveying relevant
information to counsel.
61
While the interest of autonomy is paramount, competing values may
warrant reflection in the decisional components of a representational
competence construct. In 1979, Professor Alan R. Felthous argued that
competency to waive counsel and "make one's defense" should serve
these purposes: (1) ensure reliability of criminal adjudications, (2)
assure a fair trial, and (3) protect the dignity and integrity of legal
"I See id. at 553 ("A construct of 'decisional competence' is an inherent, though
derivative, feature of any legal doctrine that prescribes a norm of client autonomy.");
id. at 556-57 ("Which abilities should be regarded as necessary for legally valid
decisionmaking, and therefore included within a 'test' of decisional competence, must
derive from a normative conception of client autonomy in criminal defense."); id. at
559-60 ("The criteria for decisional competence, the procedures for resolving doubts
about competence, and the legal responses to incompetence can be sensibly
formulated only in the context of a more general theory concerning client autonomy
in the attorney-client relationship.").
156 Id. at 553.
157 See id. at 570-71.
'5 See id. at 570-76.
159 See id. at 551-52.
160 Bonnie's early work suggested that correct application of the foundational
construct of competence to assist counsel should suffice to safeguard the dignity and
reliability of the proceeding. See id. at 551-52, 555, 561. In a 1995 article regarding
the trial of Colin Ferguson, however, Bonnie indicated that a court could prohibit a
defendant from representing himself - even if the defendant is competent to stand
trial and decisionally competent to waive the right to counsel - if his self-
representation would undermine the dignity of the trial process. See Bonnie, Ferguson,
supra note 40, at A23.
161 See Bonnie, Beyond Dusky and Drope, supra note 26, at 551-52, 555, 561.
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processes. 62 In Edwards, the U.S. Supreme Court drew upon these
purposes in justifying the permissibility of a higher standard for self-
representation at trial. First, the Court stressed that "insofar as a
defendant's lack of capacity threatens an improper conviction or
sentence, self-representation in that exceptional context undercuts the
most basic of the Constitution's criminal law objectives, providing a
fair trial."' 63 In addition, "proceedings must not only be fair, they must
'appear fair to all who observe them.' "1' To exemplify this point, the
Court in Edwards cited the response of a psychiatrist who observed, in
horror, a patient trying to conduct his own defense. 65 The patient,
who represented himself in a murder case, "dressed as a cowboy in
court, tried to subpoena Jesus[,] and clearly traumatized his estranged
wife... in a cross-examination that forced her to relive the murders of
her parents."'166 The experience led the psychiatrist to question the
legitimacy of a system that allows an "insane man" to defend
himself.16
7
Concerns of reliability and fairness - even if considered secondary
to the value of autonomy - implicate an additional set of functional
abilities. When a defendant rejects his counsel's assistance and
proceeds to trial alone, the reliability of the judicial outcome will
depend on the defendant's ability and willingness to challenge the
prosecution and to function, to some minimal degree, as its adversary.
The defendant will not have the benefit of his counsel's recognition of
points at which decisions may be made, identification of options,
evaluation of those options, or construction of a plan of action
consistent with the decision reached. And for the most part, a pro se
defendant is not entitled to a trial judge's advice or instruction. 168
162 See Alan R. Felthous, Competency to Waive Counsel: A Step Beyond Competency to
Stand Trial, 7 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 471, 474 (1979). Fethous identified as a fourth
purpose the need to ensure that a defendant, if found guilty, knows why he is being
punished. Id. Satisfaction of the Dusky standard likely suffices to satisfy this concern.
163 Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 2387 (2008).
164 Id. (quoting Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160 (1988)).
165 Id.
166 Turley, supra note 19, at A21 (discussing case of Scott Louis Panetti). The
defendant was convicted after the jury deliberated for ninety minutes, but his
execution was stayed by the Supreme Court on grounds of insanity. Id.
167 Edwards, 128 S. Ct. at 2387 (quoting Brief of Ohio et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioner at 24, Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379 (No. 07-208), 2008 WL
449963); Turley, supra note 19, at A21.
" See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 183 (1984) (stating that pro se
defendant has no "constitutional right to receive personal instruction from the trial
judge on courtroom procedure"). Surveying the case law, Myron Moskovitz concluded
that a trial judge must advise the pro se defendant of his right to trial (i.e., to plead not
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Several cognitive capacities are relevant to a defendant's ability to
challenge the prosecution's case and therefore may be necessary to
ensure minimally reliable and fair proceedings. First, in an ideal
world, the defendant would be able to comprehend - without the
assistance of counsel - the government's case.1 69 He would
understand the elements of the charged offense, be capable of
identifying facts (including physical evidence and likely witness
testimony) helpful to the prosecution, and assess the legal significance
of that evidence in relation to the elements of the offense and the
government's burden of proof. Second, the defendant would be able
and willing to apply a critical eye to the prosecution's case. He would
be capable of following the evidence adduced at trial and able to
identify deficiencies within the context of the government's theory of
liability. Third, he would be able to shape a rational, responsive
defense. This process would involve (in addition to identifying
deficiencies in the prosecution's evidence) locating favorable evidence,
understanding its legal relevance, identifying and evaluating possible
defenses, and selecting the defense most likely to result in acquittal or
that otherwise best accords with the defendant's values. Finally, the
defendant would be able to implement his defense through the myriad
decisions made at trial. 17
0
guilty) and his right to a jury trial. See Myron Moskovitz, Advising the Pro Se Defendant:
The Trial Court's Duties Under Faretta, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 329, 333 (2004) (exploring
extent to which trial judge must assist pro se defendant). A trial judge should not,
however, help the defendant evaluate the benefits and disadvantages of these options or
provide strategic advice. See id. Nor, in most jurisdictions, must a trial judge inform the
defendant of his privilege against self-incrimination, his right to testify, his right of
compulsory process, his right of confrontation, his right to exercise peremptory
challenges, or his right to make opening or closing statements. See id. at 333-37.
169 To some degree, a defendant must be able to comprehend the state's case in
order to stand trial. See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam)
(holding that defendant must have "a rational as well as factual understanding of the
proceedings against him" to be competent to stand trial); see also Drope v. Missouri,
420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (stating that, to stand trial, person must possess "the
capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him"). Courts
have interpreted this standard to require that a defendant be able to appreciate his
status as a defendant in a criminal prosecution and understand the charges, the
purpose of the criminal process, and the purpose of the adversary system, including
the role served by defense counsel. See Bonnie, Beyond Dusky and Drope, supra note
26, at 554 & nn.62-63. To satisfy this standard, a defendant generally must
demonstrate comprehension of information presented by counsel or the trial court.
170 Decisions subsidiary to the selection of a defense include what information and
argument to include in an opening statement, which witnesses to cross-examine and
what lines of inquiry to pursue, what evidence to object to and on what grounds,
which witnesses (if any) to call, whether to testify, what physical evidence (if any) to
introduce, and what information and argument to emphasize in a closing statement.
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This is not to suggest that all of these abilities are appropriate for
inclusion in a representational competence standard or that a
defendant should be capable of performing any of these functions well.
Requiring a mastery of these processes would restrict the right to self-
representation to those trained in the law, a result clearly at odds with
the U.S. Supreme Court's intent in Faretta v. California, which first
established the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation. 7 '
Indeed, few recent law school graduates possess all of these abilities.
But any serious discussion of capacities relevant to ensuring the
reliability of a criminal adjudication should at least consider a subset
of the skills inherent in the adversary process.
While the elements of Bonnie's decisional competence construct are
limited to those abilities he deemed necessary to ensure autonomous
decisionmaking, reliability and dignity concerns also impacted
Bonnie's analysis of when to require particular abilities in a given
context. Bonnie argued that "[t]he choice of a test of competence in a
particular decisionmaking context should take into account the
consequences, for both the defendant and society, of determinations of
competence and incompetence in that particular context." '172 Societal
consequences include reliability and, presumably, the actual and
apparent fairness of criminal adjudications. An underlying concern for
the reliability of criminal adjudications led Bonnie to advocate for
stringent decisional tests - the absence of implausible beliefs in a
defendant's decisional framework 73 and the presence of a logical,
deliberate reasoning process74 - in decisional contexts in which
171 See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 833 n.43 (1975) (anticipating that right
to self-representation would be available to "ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble
intellect"); see also id. at 835 (recognizing that "a defendant need not himself have the
skill and experience of a lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose self-
representation"); id. at 836 ("We need make no assessment of how well or poorly
Faretta had mastered the intricacies of the hearsay rule and the California code
provisions that govern challenges of potential jurors on voir dire. For his technical
legal knowledge, as such, was not relevant to an assessment of his knowing exercise of
the right to defend himself."). In Faretta, the Supreme Court considered the claim of a
state defendant with a high school education who did not want to be represented by
the public defender due to his belief that that office was "very loaded down with ... a
heavy case load." Id. at 807. Relying on the history of the right to self-representation,
the text of the Sixth Amendment, and the importance of a defendant's autonomy
interest, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment implicitly provides that a criminal
defendant has a constitutional right to proceed without counsel when he voluntarily
and intelligently elects to do so. See id. at 832-34.
172 Bonnie, Beyond Dusky and Drope, supra note 26, at 575.
173 See id. at 574-75.
"' See id. at 575.
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reliability is particularly at risk. 175 Bonnie also argued that, even if a
defendant meets the stringent test of the reasoned choice standard and
so is decisionally competent to waive his right to counsel, a court may
still deny his motion for self-representation if granting the request
would undermine the dignity of the trial process. 176 These positions
have led subsequent commentators to criticize Bonnie's framework as
insufficiently deferential of defendants' autonomy.
177
It is possible that identifying a broader set of abilities requisite to
autonomous decisionmaking could reduce the overall stringency of
the standard a defendant must meet to proceed pro se. For instance, it
may be easier for a defendant to meet a low threshold for several
abilities typically found in the general population than to meet a very
high threshold for a single ability (e.g., a deliberate and complex
reasoning process) more rarely held. Possessing multiple decisional
abilities that lie at the heart of the adversarial process may also better
protect the reliability and fairness of the proceeding. Before
proceeding to investigate additional decisional abilities, however, it is
useful to discuss two additional reasons why Bonnie's construct of
adjudicative competence provides an insufficient basis for determining
whether to allow self-representation at trial. These include important
contextual differences in decisionmaking by represented and
unrepresented defendants and problems inherent in assuming that
medical treatment decisionmaking is analogous to self-representation.
B. Contextual Differences
Bonnie generated his decisional competence proposal in the context
of decisions that defendants are authorized to make when represented
by counsel. In Bonnie's words, decisional competence "derives from
legal rules that establish that the defendant must make or have the
prerogative to make certain decisions regarding the defense or
disposition of the case." 178 These decisions - including whether to
175 Bonnie argues that "the tension between reliability and autonomy should be
resolved in favor of a particularly demanding test of competence" when "a substantial
risk of injustice exists," such as when a defendant waives representation by counsel or
insists on pleading guilty against the advice of counsel. Id. at 579-80.
176 See Bonnie, Ferguson, supra note 40, at A23.
177 For reasons similar to those expressed by Professors Slobogin and Mashburn, I
believe that the reasoned choice and substantial appreciation elements of Bonnie's
decisional competence construct are insufficiently deferential to autonomy. See
Slobogin & Mashburn, supra note 36, at 1597, 1600-03.
178 Bonnie, Beyond Dusky and Drope, supra note 26, at 553.
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plead guilty,179 waive the right to a jury trial, 180 waive the right to
counsel,' 8 ' testify,'82 and be present at trial'8 3 - "legally and ethically
require a defendant's personal participation."' 84 Because a defendant
should participate in "fundamental" decisions, Bonnie reasoned, the
defendant should possess at least a subset of the abilities needed for
self-interested decisionmaking. 85 Bonnie grounded his competency
tests in "a practical understanding of the attorney-client
relationship." 8 6 He suggested that the most stringent decisional
competency standard - reasoned choice - should apply when a
defendant seeks to act against the advice of counsel and a substantial
risk of injustice exists.187
Two key differences distinguish the decisional context a represented
defendant faces when making a fundamental decision from that which
an unrepresented defendant encounters at trial. First, the few
decisions entrusted to a defendant represented by counsel can
generally be made in advance of trial, in a calm environment with
minimal time constraints. Prior to trial, an attorney and his client will
anticipate decisions concerning whether to plead guilty, testify, or
request a jury trial and can consider these choices at their relative
leisure. A pro se defendant, however, will need to make hundreds of
decisions during the course of trial, often while an impatient
decisionmaker (the judge or jury) is waiting. As Bonnie recognized,
his construct does not take into account the significant pressures and
stresses of trial. 1
88
Second, and more fundamentally, counsel will assist a represented
defendant in making the decisions identified by Bonnie.'89 As a matter
17' See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969).
18o Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 278 (1942).
181 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975).
182 Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51-53 (1987);Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751
(1983) (dictum).
183 Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 418 n.24 (1988) (dictum).
14 Bonnie, Beyond Dusky and Drope, supra note 26, at 568-69.
185 See id. at 545, 568-69. Professors Grisso and Appelbaum defined these
capacities, in the context of competence to consent to medical treatment, to include
the abilities to express a choice, understand factual information, appreciate the
personal significance of relevant information, and reason. See id. at 570 & n.111
(citing Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso, Assessing Patients' Capacities to Consent
to Treatment, 319 NEw ENG.J. MED. 1635 (1988)).
186 Bonnie, A Theoretical Reformulation, supra note 26, at 306.
187 See Bonnie, Beyond Dusky and Drope, supra note 26, at 579.
l See id. at 554-55, 557 n.68; see also POYTRESS ET AL., supra note 109, at 89.
188 Counsel has an ethical duty to advise the defendant and assist him in reaching
what, in the attorney's view, is a prudent decision. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
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of basic ethics, counsel should identify for his client the decision
point, clarify the issue, distill the possible options, gather relevant
information, perform key analysis, and present his recommendation.1 90
The task left to a represented defendant is to select among the options
outlined by his counsel.191
Two examples illustrate the latter point regarding counsel's
assistance in decisionmaking. In the course of advising a defendant
concerning whether to testify, counsel will perform much of the
evaluative work. He will explain the mechanics of testifying, the
subjects likely to be covered, and the relationship between testifying
and cross-examination. Counsel will also assess the benefits and
potential hazards of testifying. As the Maryland Court of Appeals in
Martin v. State explained:
Counsel, of course, would presumably know of any prior
inconsistent statements given by the defendant and of any
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 20 (2000) ("A lawyer must notify a client of decisions to
be made by the client under §§ 21-23 and must explain a matter to the extent
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation."); id. § 22 ("As between client and lawyer, subject to Subsection (2)
and § 23, the following and comparable decisions are reserved to the client except
when the client has validly authorized the lawyer to make the particular decision:
whether and on what terms to settle a claim; how a criminal defendant should plead;
whether a criminal defendant should waive jury trial; whether a criminal defendant
should testify; and whether to appeal in a civil proceeding or criminal prosecution.");
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2002) ("A lawyer shall explain a matter to the
extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding
the representation."). The amount of information that an attorney must disclose varies
according to the situation. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 20
cmt. e ("The lawyer ordinarily must explain the pros and cons of reasonably available
alternatives. The appropriate detail depends on such factors as the importance of the
decision, how much advice the client wants, what the client has already learned and
considered, and the time available for deliberation.").
190 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 20; Anne Bowen Poulin, Strengthening the Criminal Defendant's
Right to Counsel, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1213, 1246 (2006) ("When courts treat
defendants as having absolute control, the defendant's decision will be informed by
advice of counsel.").
191 In light of this allocation of decisionmaking authority - and the significant
assistance that counsel will provide for those few decisions entrusted to the defendant
- Bonnie suggested that the primary norm implicated by a defendant's possession of
decisional competence is his autonomy, not the reliability of the proceeding. See
Bonnie, Mental Retardation, supra note 26, at 430-31. In other words, given counsel's
role in making key decisions and advising the defendant as to those few decisions
within his authority, allowing the adjudication of a defendant without decisional
competence would not pose a significant threat to the accuracy or fairness of the
proceeding.
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criminal convictions that might be used for impeachment
purposes. He would consider what the defendant would say if
he testified, how he might hold up under cross-examination
by the prosecutor, and the nature and extent of any
inconsistency between the expected testimony of the
defendant and other evidence in the case, and develop some
approximation of his overall credibility. From all of this,
counsel could gauge the prospect of impeachment in a
meaningful way, weigh it against the effect of leaving the
State's evidence unrebutted by the defendant's testimony, and
advise the defendant accordingly.
92
Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court has observed that, when deciding
whether to plead guilty or assert his right to proceed to trial, a
represented defendant will "rely upon his counsel to make an
independent examination of the facts, circumstances, pleadings[,] and
laws involved and then to offer his informed opinion as to what plea
should be entered."1 93 Thus, even for "fundamental rights" that lie
within the control of a defendant, counsel plays a vital role in assuring
that the defendant's decision is sound. A pro se defendant benefits
from no such safeguard. This reality also contributes to a conclusion
that Bonnie's analogy of decisionmaking within a criminal
adjudication to medical decisionmaking is inapt for self-
representation.
C. Improper Analogy to Medical Treatment Decisionmaking
The final reason why Bonnie's approach to decisional competence is
inapplicable to self-representation lies in its derivation from the model
for competency to consent to medical treatment. Professor Bruce
Winick invoked the analogy between decisionmaking in criminal
representation and that in therapeutic settings. 94 Bonnie drew upon
192 Martin v. State, 535 A.2d 951, 954 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988).
193 Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 721 (1948) (plurality opinion).
194 See Bonnie, Beyond Dusky and Drope, supra note 26, at 543 ("Professor
Winick's article made an important contribution by linking the literature on
competence of criminal defendants to the literature on treatment decisionmaking.");
see also Bruce J. Winick, Restructuring Competency to Stand Trial, 32 UCLA L. REV.
921, 962-68 (1985) (noting that when mentally or physically ill patient assents to
treatment, even if assent is not fully competent, the patient's decision is honored, and
that likewise presumption should exist in favor of accepting defendant's assent to
stand trial or to plead guilty, despite any mental impairment); Bruce J. Winick,
Incompetency to Stand Trial: An Assessment of Costs and Benefits, and a Proposal for
Reform, 39 RUTGERs L. REV. 243, 268-71 (1987) (restating analogy).
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Professor Winick's insight1 95 and applied to criminal adjudication the
construct developed by Professors Grisso and Appelbaum to measure a
patient's competence to consent to medical treatment. 19 6 There are
many similarities in the decisional contexts of responding to a
physician's advice for medical treatment and responding to an
attorney's advice for decisions relating to criminal adjudication, and
thus Bonnie's application of principles of therapeutic competence to
criminal adjudication represents a valuable insight. 197 A significant
limitation of Bonnie's proposal, however, stems from his decision not
to consider the applicability of decisional abilities beyond those
included in the Grisso and Appelbaum construct that might be
relevant for decisionmaking without the assistance of counsel.'9 8
Grisso and Appelbaum drew upon the work of Professor Loren H.
Roth and his colleagues, who in 1977 scrutinized judicial opinions,
statutes, regulations, and proposed agency guidelines to identify
various tests utilized by legal authorities for competency to consent to
medical treatment.199 Roth's analysis revealed that courts did not apply
a uniform standard to judge a patient's competence to consent, but
rather chose from a small number of possible standards to select the
test to be used in a particular instance."° These standards included
evidencing a choice, arriving at a "reasonable" outcome, basing one's
choice on "rational" reasons, possessing the ability to understand, and
demonstrating actual understanding.2 "' Rejecting the "reasonable"
See Bonnie, Beyond Dusky and Drope, supra note 26, at 543, 548.
196 See id. at 570 & n.111 (citing Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso, Assessing
Patients' Capacities to Consent to Treatment, 319 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1635 (1988)).
Professor Maroney also relied on the medical treatment literature in deriving her
decisional competency standard. See Maroney, supra note 129, at 1392 & n.98.
197 See Slobogin & Mashburn, supra note 36, at 1596-97.
198 See Bonnie, Beyond Dusky and Drope, supra note 26, at 570-71 ("The
conceptual terrain according to Appelbaum and Grisso includes abilities to (1)
communicate a choice; (2) understand information; (3) appreciate the significance of
information in relation to one's own situation; and (4) engage in a process of rational
manipulation, or reasoning.... Building on this foundation, and on the skimpy case
law on decisional competence in criminal adjudication, I will present a menu of five
progressively more inclusive legal tests.").
"I See Loren H. Roth et al., Tests of Competency to Consent to Treatment, 134 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 279, 280-82 (1977). This seminal work by Roth and his colleagues led to
an "evolving consensus" about the standards that courts typically apply when
determining a patient's competence to consent to treatment. See GRISSO, supra note
126, at 394, 398; Appelbaum & Grisso, The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study,
supra note 127, at 105, 108.
200 Appelbaum & Grisso, The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study, supra note
127, at 108.
201 Roth et al., supra note 199, at 280-82.
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outcome of choice test as insufficiently deferential to autonomy, °2
Grisso and Appelbaum modified and refined the remaining standards
and presented them as "maxims" for legal competence to consent to
treatment.203 Each legal standard implicates a set of decisional abilities,
which together constitute the domain of functional abilities relevant to
legal competence for informed consent.2 ' These abilities include the
capacity to communicate a choice, to understand relevant information,
to appreciate the nature of the situation and its likely consequences,
and to manipulate information rationally.
20 5
Critically, the four abilities that Grisso and Appelbaum identified as
necessary for competence to consent to medical treatment were not
generated through an application of psychological theory, an
evaluation of which psychological functions are most crucial to
decisionmaking as a descriptive matter, or a normative exploration of
which abilities should be required for informed decisionmaking. °6
Rather, Grisso and Appelbaum derived these abilities from the
particular legal standards identified by Roth and his colleagues as
governing informed consent.0 7 According to Stephen Anderer, while
Grisso and Appelbaum "believed that starting with psychological
functions would allow for instruments with ... greater theoretical
coherence," they "felt constrained to use [legal standards that had
been developed by courts on an ad hoc basis] in order to maximize
ecological validity. '
20 8
202 See GRISSO, supra note 126, at 454. Grisso explained that he and Appelbaum
rejected the "reasonable" outcome of choice test because:
It suggests that individuals are competent if they choose what others would
choose, whereas modem notions of informed consent allow individuals to
make whatever choice they wish as long as they have the capacities to
understand, appreciate, reason, and express a choice.
Id.
203 Id. at 394. Appelbaum and Grisso also presented case law applying each of the
four tests of competency. See Appelbaum & Grisso, The MacArthur Treatment
Competence Study, supra note 127, at 109-11.
204 See id. at 109.
205 See id. at 109-11.
206 See THOMAS GRISSO & PAUL S. APPELBAUM, ASSESSING COMPETENCE TO CONSENT TO
TREATMENT: A GUIDE FOR PHYSICIANS AND OTHER HEALTH PROFESSIONALS 31-32 (Oxford
Univ. Press 1998) (describing process through which four functional abilities were
selected).
207 See GRISSo, supra note 126, at 400 ("[These four abilities] are important to
consider when determining what functional abilities are relevant for forensic
evaluations of competence, because one or more of them will be used by virtually all
courts."); see also GRISSO & APPELBAUM, supra note 206, at 20.
208 S. J. Anderer, Development of an Instrument to Evaluate the Capacity of Elderly
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Given the origins of the "maxims" for competence to consent to
medical treatment, further analysis is needed to determine whether the
four abilities identified by Roth and his colleagues, as refined by
Grisso and Appelbaum, constitute the optimal or essential abilities for
autonomous decisionmaking by criminal defendants.2" Grisso and
Appelbaum acknowledged that other cognitive capacities not
encompassed by their competency test are relevant to informed
decisionmaking, including problem-solving abilities. 210 Even the four
elements embraced by Grisso and Appelbaum are not without
contention: neither courts nor medical ethicists agree as to their
conceptualization or inclusion in a standard of competence.2 1 ' Grisso
and Appelbaum observed that, while courts and medical ethicists
generally agree that competence to consent should require the ability
to understand information disclosed under the law of informed
consent,212 courts and ethicists only "sometimes" recognize the
element of reasoning as an essential element. 13 Spirited disagreement
exists, in particular, over requiring an appreciation element.214
It may be normatively optimal to require represented defendants to
possess a subset of the abilities identified by Grisso and Appelbaum,
Persons to Make Personal Care and Financial Decisions 55 (May 1997) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Allegheny University of Health Sciences) (on file with Hahnemann
Library, Drexel University).
209 Cf. Lynne S. Webber, et al., Assessing Financial Competence, 9 PSYCHIATRY,
PSYCHOL. & L. 248, 250 (2002) (arguing that measures of decisionmaking abilities in
one situation are not necessarily valid proxy measures of financial competency).
210 See GRISSO & APPELBAUM, supra note 206, at 20 ("What cognitive abilities and
characteristics might be relevant when assessing patients' functioning in decision-
making situations? Certainly a number could be nominated: orientation, attention,
memory, intelligence, abstract thinking and problem-solving, to name only a few.").
211 See id. at 31-33; see also Paul S. Appelbaum, Assessment of Patients' Competence
to Consent to Treatment, 357 N. ENG. J. MED. 1834, 1838 (1997) ("Notwithstanding
general recognition of the criteria for decision-making capacity, there is a divergence
of opinion about which criteria should be included and how they should be
applied.").
212 See GRISSO & APPELBAUM, supra note 206, at 38; Christopher Slobogin,
"Appreciation" as a Measure of Competency: Some Thoughts About the MacArthur
Group's Approach, 2 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y, & L. 18, 21 (1996) ("With perhaps a few
exceptions, everyone seems to agree that to be competent one must understand the
legally relevant facts, regardless of the context.").
213 GRISSO & APPELBAUM, supra note 206, at 52.
214 Broad disagreement exists concerning the conceptualization and inclusion of
the element of appreciation. See id. at 43; Slobogin, supra note 212, at 21-27 (arguing,
in essence, that "substantial rationality" test, as captured in Perceptions of Disorder
(POD) instrument, is too subjective, too deferential to physicians' judgments, and
insufficiently deferential to patients' beliefs and values, and thus is normatively
undesirable).
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given that in many ways criminal defendants represented by counsel
are similarly situated to patients advised by physicians. However, in
light of the descriptive legal origin of the abilities, one should not
assume that the extension of these capacities to the criminal justice
context as a normative matter is appropriate.215 It is even more
dubious to apply these standards unblinkingly to self-representation at
trial, which presents a host of decisional and situational demands not
encountered in the context of informed consent.
16
Perhaps more fundamentally, competence to consent to medical
treatment, like competence to stand trial, is premised on the
disclosure of material information by an expert.2 17 Informed consent
consists of three elements: disclosure of treatment-relevant
information, voluntariness of a patient's decision, and a patient's
competence to consent.21 s Some jurisdictions may measure the
adequacy of a physician's disclosure differently, 219 but a majority
requires that a physician disclose the information that a reasonable
patient would find material to a decision about a proposed
treatment.22° Under prevailing law, a patient should receive five bodies
of information from his physician: information on the nature of the
215 In recognition of Bonnie's effort to apply their competency construct to criminal
adjudication, Appelbaum and Grisso noted that "[alithough this model was
formulated explicitly to describe competence judgments related to consent for
treatment, it may well be more broadly applicable to decision-making competence in
general." Appelbaum & Grisso, The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study, supra
note 127, at 111 n.3.
216 Cf. Anderer, supra note 208, at 37-38 (concluding that dimensions of
decisionmaking captured by Grisso and Appelbaum's competency construct for
informed consent are insufficient in context of guardianship, due to unstructured
nature of decisions in everyday living and difference in legal standards).
217 See Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso, Assessing Patients' Capacities to
Consent to Treatment, 319(25) NEw ENG. J. OF MED. 1635, 1637 (1988) [hereinafter
Appelbaum & Grisso, Assessing Patients' Capacities to Consent] ("Except in cases of the
most severe mental impairments, it is not possible to assess decision-making ability
when a patient is uninformed or inadequately informed. For their ability to be
demonstrated, patients must be supplied with sufficient information on which to base
a decision about treatment - the nature of the disorder and of the proposed
intervention, the likely benefits, risks, and discomforts, and possible alternatives,
including the option of no treatment, along with their risks and benefits.").
218 See GRISSO, supra note 126, at 391-92; Appelbaum & Grisso, The MacArthur
Treatment Competence Study, supra note 127, at 106.
219 A minority of jurisdictions requires that physicians disclose "that amount of
information that a reasonable member of their profession would discuss with patients
in a similar situation." GRisso & APPELBAUM, supra note 206, at 7-8 (discussing
"professional standard of disclosure" as proposed in Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093
(Kan. 1960)).
220 GRISSO & APPELBAUM, supra note 206, at 8.
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disorder for which treatment is proposed, the nature of the proposed
treatment, the risks and benefits associated with the treatment and
their likelihood of occurrence, and any available alternatives to the
proposed treatment, along with their risks and benefits.21 A physician
should convey information in a manner designed to facilitate a
patient's comprehension.222 Failure to provide sufficient information
may expose a physician to liability for assault and battery or
negligence.223 Thus, a physician (not a patient) will define the
problem, present alternative treatments, and identify and evaluate the
benefits and disadvantages of those alternatives.224
Competence to consent to medical treatment is not separable from
the disclosure requirement.225 One commentator reported that "some
psychologists have begun conceptually to merge the competence and
informed elements in the legal model by viewing competence as a
function of the manner in which information is presented to
[individuals]. ' 226 Indeed, competence is defined in relation to the
disclosed information. Grisso defined "competence to consent" as "an
individual's legal capacity to accept a proposed treatment, to refuse
treatment, or to select among treatment options. '" 227 Thus, an
individual in the sphere of informed consent occupies a place of
relative passivity: he receives information, its evaluation, and a
recommendation; he then must use his mental processes to either
accept or reject the advice. 228 A pro se defendant who proceeds to trial,
on the other hand, must be proactive in identifying decision points,
gathering relevant information, brainstorming decisional options, and
evaluating those options in light of his case.
Other contextual differences exist as well. First, a physician's role is
to encourage his patient to participate in treatment designed to
221 GRISSO, supra note 126, at 393-94.
222 Id. at 394. Grisso recommended that, to ensure that a person's incompetence is
not a product of poor disclosure of information, the disclosure should be evaluated for
its clarity, complexity of verbal explanation, length, method of disclosure, and the
amount of time a patient was given to process the information. See id. at 401.
223 William M. Altman et al., Autonomy, Competence, and Informed Consent in Long
Term Care: Legal and Psychological Perspectives, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1671, 1677 (1992).
224 See Anderer, supra note 208, at 38 (listing differences between decisionmaking
in context of informed consent and in everyday decisionmaking about personal and
financial affairs).
225 GRISSO, supra note 126, at 392.
226 Altman et al., supra note 223, at 1692.
227 GRISSO, supra note 126, at 392.
228 See GRIsso & APPELBAUM, supra note 206, at 10 (referring to patient's ability to
"utilize the disclosed information" as essence of capacity to consent).
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improve the patient's health.229 To that end, the physician will be
committed to facilitating decisions that he believes are in his patient's
best interest.2 30 A pro se defendant, on the other hand, will lack not
only an expert's assistance in evaluating options, but also his
sympathetic ear and aid in clarifying the defendant's thoughts with
probing questions. Also, consenting to medical treatment is a
relatively private decision, typically involving a patient, his family or
friends (if any and present), and his medical team. A pro se defendant,
however, will need to make and express decisions before a neutral or
perhaps hostile audience: inconvenienced jurors and witnesses, and a
judge likely frustrated by the pro se defendant's lack of familiarity with
procedural and evidentiary rules. Self-representation also necessitates
making and communicating decisions in the public forum of a trial, a
particularly stressful prospect for some persons.
In addition, consenting to medical treatment typically involves one
decision.3 A patient often will choose between several treatment
options (at a minimum, the proposed treatment and no treatment),
each with its own risks and benefits, but the choice, though perhaps
complicated, likely is a single decision. Self-representation at trial, by
contrast, involves hundreds of decisions made in short succession.232 A
pro se defendant will need to make these decisions quickly, and
ideally the decisions reached should not be inherently contradictory.
Also, while a patient might opt to revisit his decision, his task
generally ends once he communicates his decision to his medical
team. A pro se defendant, however, must (unless assisted by standby
counsel) translate his decisions into courtroom-appropriate action.
Finally, a pro se defendant who proceeds to trial must, to some
degree, serve an important societal role in subjecting the prosecution's
229 See Appelbaum & Grisso, The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study, supra
note 127, at 106 (referring to aim of informed consent law as "encouraging patients'
participation in the decision-making process").
230 See Appelbaum & Grisso, Assessing Patients' Capacities to Consent, supra note
217, at 1637 ("Because depriving patients of their decision-making rights is a serious
infringement of liberty, every effort should be made to help each patient perform best.
Thus, if a patient has difficulty understanding relevant information, the examiner
should try to educate the patient before concluding that the deficiency is fixed.").
231 A patient may, of course, change his mind as to that decision, but it is still, at
base, one decision.
232 These decisions include, but are not limited to, which defense to exert and how
to establish it, which witnesses to call and what to ask them, whether to testify and
what to say, what evidence to introduce and how to introduce it, whether and how to
cross-examine unfavorable witnesses, whether and how to object to incompetent
evidence, what to include in opening and closing statements, and which jurors to
strike and on what basis.
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case to adversarial testing. Whereas the consequences of a patient's
decision to reject lifesaving treatment arguably do not extend beyond
the patient and his loved ones,233 the government has a strong interest
in a pro se defendant's ability and willingness to challenge its case and
thus contribute to the reliability of the proceeding and further the
legitimacy of the criminal justice system.2 34 As discussed previously,
serving as the government's adversary - without the benefit of an
attorney's assistance and advice - calls for a host of cognitive
capacities not implicated in the context of informed consent.
In light of the origins and limited normative underpinnings of
Bonnie's decisional competence proposal, we must look elsewhere for
guidance as to which abilities may be requisite to decisions made in
the course of self-representation that are worthy of judicial deference.
At base, self-representation is an exercise in problem solving.
Psychologists and other experts in the mind sciences have identified
cognitive, behavioral, and affective abilities necessary for effective
decisionmaking. This Article now turns to an examination of one
psychological theory, social problem solving, to glean insight into
potential abilities for sound, autonomous decisionmaking in the
context of self-representation at trial.
IV. INSIGHTS FROM SOCIAL PROBLEM-SOLVING THEORY
To recognize the applicability of problem-solving theory for self-
representation at trial, it may be useful to imagine yourself in the
shoes of a pro se defendant. You are charged with theft. You inform
your court-appointed attorney that you did not take your neighbor's
property; this is a case of mistaken identity. Your attorney seems
skeptical and suggests that, while you might have taken the property,
perhaps you intended to return it. Frustrated and confident of your
ability to persuade a jury of your innocence, you fire your attorney
and move to proceed pro se. Your motion is granted, and, because
yours is a relatively straightforward case, the court does not appoint
standby counsel to assist you. You now face many decisions, not the
least of which is what defense to exert. From the perspective of the
court, what are the stages of the decisionmaking process through
233 See Nancy J. Knauer, Defining Capacity: Balancing the Competing Interests of
Autonomy and Need, 12 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REv. 321, 327-28 (2003) (suggesting
that relatively low capacity threshold for right to refuse medical treatment reflects
society's belief that individual - even one with borderline mental competency -
should be able to exercise control over his health, when that decision does not intrude
upon rights of others).
234 See Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 2387 (2008).
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which you should proceed to arrive at a sound defense? What abilities
does each decisionmaking stage require? Which of these abilities are
essential to ensure that your chosen defense is the result of
autonomous decisionmaking and does not pose too grave a threat to
the reliability or fairness of the proceeding? Must you be capable of
analyzing the government's evidence, for example? Should you possess
the ability to brainstorm multiple options before deciding upon a
course of action? Must your defense be plausible? Must you possess
the will to challenge the prosecution's case at all?
Problem-solving theory offers an answer to many of the questions
posed. As numerous commentators have observed, modern law treats
competency as a functional construct tailored to the demands of a
particular context. 35 To identify the range of decisional abilities
potentially necessary for self-representation at trial, our initial inquiry
should focus on disaggregating the problem-solving process in which
a defendant must engage in order to control his defense.2 36 This
disaggregation will allow us to identify abilities necessary for making
decisions worthy of deference without the assistance of counsel at a
criminal trial.
The law has relied on psychological insight into problem solving in
a variety of contexts. Academics and the American Bar Association
have long identified problem solving as essential to effective
lawyering. 237 In addition, psychologists have used problem-solving
theory to derive the functional components of various competency
standards. In operationalizing the reasoning component of informed
consent, for instance, psychologists have drawn on problem-solving
235 See, e.g., GRisso, supra note 126, at 22-24.
236 See Knauer, supra note 233, at 326 (illustrating functional nature of capacity by
observing that standard of testamentary capacity disaggregates elements of
testamentary plan and incorporates them as features of legal standard).
237 See, e.g., Josiah M. Daniel III, A Proposed Definition of the Term "Lawyering," 101
LAw LIBR. J. 207, 213-14 (2009) (reporting that American Bar Association task force,
created to study and propose how to improve process by which law students are
prepared for practice, identified "fundamental lawyering skills essential for competent
representation" as including problem solving, legal analysis, legal research, factual
investigation, communication, counseling, negotiation, litigation, and alternate
dispute resolution); Linda Morton, A New Approach to Health Care ADR: Training Law
Students to be Problem Solvers in the Health Care Context, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 965, 966
(2005) (analyzing "use of real public health problems to train law students in problem
solving, with the hope that ultimately such training will become more
interdisciplinary"); Leonard L. Riskin & Nancy A. Welsh, Is That All There Is?: "The
Problem" in Court-Oriented Mediation, 15 GEO. MASON L. REv. 863, 867-68, 902-07
(2008) (suggesting broader definitions of legal problems for more effective problem
solving in context of mediation).
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theory. 38 Similarly, psychologists have used problem-solving theory to
identify functional abilities relevant to managing one's personal
finances, which is one aspect of guardianship determinations.2 39
Social problem solving is one of the earliest and most
comprehensive psychological models of decisionmaking.2 ° Developed
by Professors Marvin R. Goldfried and Thomas D'Zurilla241 and refined
by D'Zurilla and Professor Arthur M. Nezu,242  the model is
238 In developing their instrument to evaluate individuals' reasoning process, called
Thinking Rationally About Treatment ("TRAT"), Grisso and Appelbaum chose to
include elements common among the problem-solving models developed by George
Spivack and his colleagues, Irving L. Janis and Leon Mann, and Robin M. Hogarth. See
Anderer, supra note 208, at 52. Those elements include "seeking information,
generating consequences, weighting consequences, recognizing the probability of
consequences, and comparing alternatives." Id. at 52. All five of these elements are
included in the D'Zurilla, Goldfried, and Nezu model. Id. at 52-53.
239 Anderer drew from social problem-solving theory when creating his functional
assessment instrument, the Decisionmaking Instrument for Guardianship ("DIG"). See
id. at 54-76. While he found all aspects of the D'Zurilla and Nezu model applicable, he
included problem definition and formulation, generation of alternatives, and
consequential and comparative thinking (two reasoning abilities that fall within the
decisionmaking stage of the D'Zurilla-Nezu model) in his instrument due to
limitations in his chosen format. See id. at 63-69, 76.
Financial competency may provide a useful analogy to representational competence.
Financial management is a cognitively complex, multidimensional activity that bears
critically on individuals' functional independence and personal autonomy. See Daniel
C. Marson et al., Assessing Financial Capacity in Patients with Alzheimer Disease: A
Conceptual Model and Prototype Instrument, 57 ARCHIVES OF NEUROLOGY 877, 877-79
(2000); Roy Martin et al., Declining Financial Capacity in Patients with Mild Alzheimer
Disease: A One-Year Longitudinal Study, 16 AM. J. GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY 209, 210
(2008). Like self-representation, financial activities require technical knowledge (such
as understanding financial concepts and the components of a bank statement); the
ability to master certain prescribed, formalized routines (such as cashing a check and
depositing funds); and the application of judgment to maximize one's self-interest
(such as that necessary for prudent investment decisions and to withstand fraud). See
Jennifer Moye, Guardianship and Conservatorship, in EVALUATING COMPETENCIES:
FORENSIC ASSESSMENTS AND INSTRUMENTS 309, 323 (Grisso ed. 2003); Daniel C. Marson,
Loss of Financial Competency in Dementia: Conceptual and Empirical Approaches, 8
AGING, NEUROPSYCHOLOGY & COGNITION 164, 164 (2001). The component of financial
judgment - defined to involve "the capacity for rational, practical, considered and
astute decisions in novel, ambiguous or complex social situations" - may provide a
particularly apt analogue for decisions made in the context of self-representation. See
Moye, supra, at 324.
240 See Anderer, supra note 208, at 42.
241 Id. (citing M. R. Goldfried & T. J. D'Zurilla, A Behavioral-Analytic Model for
Assessing Competence, in 1 CURRENT ToPics IN CLINICAL AND COMMUNITY PSYCHOLOGY
(D. Spielberger ed., 1969)); see also D'Zurilla & Goldfried, supra note 45, at 107.
242 See D'ZURILLA & NEZU, PROBLEM-SOLVING THERAPY, supra note 46; D'Zurilla &
Nezu, Social Problem Solving in Adults, supra note 46.
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prescriptive, meaning that it represents a model of effective or
successful problem solving derived from clinical judgment and
research.241 While a number of decisionmaking and problem-solving
models exist, most originate from or are otherwise encompassed by
the framework that D'Zurilla and his colleagues developed.2" Social
problem solving is intended to encompass impersonal problems such
as insufficient finances, personal or intrapersonal problems such as
cognitive or health problems, interpersonal problems such as marital
conflicts, and broader community and social problems such as crime
and racial discrimination. 245 Empirical evidence supports the
application of the model to decisionmaking by a variety of
individuals,246 ranging from average college students to persons
suffering from depression or mental illness.247 Thus, social problem-
solving theory should be relevant to decisionmaking necessary for self-
representation in a criminal trial.
D'Zurilla and his colleagues defined social problem solving as the
self-directed cognitive, affective, and behavioral process by which an
individual attempts to identify effective solutions for specific problems
encountered in the natural environment. 248 This theory envisions
problem solving as consisting of a motivational component called
problem orientation and four goal-directed problem-solving skills.249
These skills include problem definition and formulation, generation of
alternative solutions, decisionmaking, and solution implementation
and verification.2 50 Each process or skill makes a distinct contribution
to the problem-solving process while interacting with and affecting the
efficacy of the other problem-solving components.25' While every
243 See A. M. NEZU ET AL., PROBLEM-SOLVING THERAPY FOR DEPRESSION: THEORY,
RESEARCH, AND CLINICAL GUIDELINES 32 (Wiley 1989).
244 See Anderer, supra note 208, at 48-53; see also D'Zurilla et al., supra note 47, at
20 (describing Problem-Solving Inventory instrument, designed by P. P. Heppner and
C.H. Petersen, as derived from items based on D'Zurilla's and Goldfried's original
problem-solving model).
245 D'Zurilla et al., supra note 47, at 11.
246 See Anderer, supra note 208, at 42.
247 See D'ZURILLA & NEzU, PROBLEM-SOLVING THERAPY, supra note 46, at 34-38
(summarizing experimental studies of various components of social problem-solving
model).
248 See D'ZURILLA & NEZU, PROBLEM-SOLVING THERAPY, supra note 46, at 10;
D'Zurilla et al., supra note 47, at 12.
249 See D'Zurilla et al., supra note 47, at 14.
250 Id.
251 See Arthur M. Nezu & Christine M. Nezu, Toward a Problem-Solving
Formulation of Psychotherapy and Clinical Decision Making, in CLINICAL DECISION
MAKING IN BEHAVIOR THERAPY: A PROBLEM-SOLVING PERSPECTIVE 35, 39 (Arthur M.
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aspect of problem solving may not be critical to a defendant's ability to
represent himself in a minimally competent way, exploration of these
abilities provides necessary context for selecting those abilities
necessary for self-representation. The components of social problem-
solving theory are described in detail below.
A. Problem Orientation
Problem orientation, the first domain of social problem solving, is a
motivational process that involves the general cognitive, affective, and
behavioral response of an individual when confronted with a specific
problem.252 Problem orientation reflects an individual's beliefs,
opinions, and feelings about problems and his own problem-solving
ability,253 and is a product primarily of an individual's previous
experience with problems and problem solving.25 4 The cognitive
component of problem orientation includes a sensitivity to recognize
problems when they occur,255 beliefs about the causes of problems,
appraisals of problems' significance for one's well-being, personal
control expectancies, and commitments of time and energy to problem
solving.256 The affective component consists of emotional states
associated with problematic situations, including negative affect (e.g.,
anger, anxiety, depression) and positive affect (e.g., hope, eagerness,
excitement).257 The behavioral component of problem orientation
consists of tendencies to confront or avoid problems.258
An individual's problem orientation may influence his appraisal of
problems, his initiation of problem-solving activities, the efficiency of
problem solving, and the amount of time and effort he is willing to
expend to cope with obstacles.259 Positive problem orientation,
Nezu & Christine M. Nezu eds., 1989) [hereinafter Nezu & Nezu, Toward a Problem-
Solving Formulation].
252 See Arthur M. Nezu & Christine M. Nezu, Problem Solving Therapy, 11 J. OF
PSYCHOTHERAPY INTEGRATION 187, 188 (2001) [hereinafter Nezu & Nezu, Problem
Solving Therapy].
253 See D'Zurilla et al., supra note 47, at 14.
254 See Thomas J. D'Zurilla & Arthur M. Nezu, Development and Preliminary
Evaluation of the Social Problem-Solving Inventory, 2 PSYCHOL. ASSESSMENT 156, 157
(1990) [hereinafter D'Zurilla & Nezu, Development and Preliminary Evaluation].
25 See Nezu & Nezu, Toward a Problem-Solving Formulation, supra note 251, at 41.
256 See D'Zurilla & Nezu, Development and Preliminary Evaluation, supra note 254,
at 157.
257 See id.
258 See id.
259 See id. at 156-57.
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associated with adaptive functioning or effective problem solving,2"
comprehends an individual's general disposition to recognize problems
accurately when they occur, correctly locate the cause of a problem,
consider problems as opportunities for benefit or gain, believe that
problems are solvable, hold optimism about one's ability to solve
problems successfully, acknowledge that solving problems requires
time and effort, and address problems with celerity rather than
avoiding them.16 1 Negative problem orientation, in contrast, involves
an individual's tendency to ignore problems, inaccurately identify the
source of a problem, consider problems to be a significant threat to his
well-being, expect problems to be intractable, doubt his ability to solve
problems, and become frustrated when problems occur.262
The concept of problem orientation may be more accessible if one
imagines a person who discovers that his car is no longer parked
where he left it the night before. An individual with positive problem
orientation would approach the mystery of the missing vehicle as
follows. He would recognize the disappearance of his car as a problem,
ascribe it to a rational source (i.e., could it have been towed? did my
roommate borrow it?), realize that not having a car is a significant but
not unmanageable problem, and allocate sufficient time and energy to
addressing the situation. He would believe himself capable of finding
his car (or at least of securing alternative transportation until he
acquires a new one) and feel "up to the challenge" of dealing with the
situation.
An individual with negative problem orientation, on the other hand,
may fail to recognize the disappearance of his car as a problem worthy
of attention or be unwilling to allocate more than a few minutes to
addressing the situation. He may believe that he is unable to deal with
a problem of this magnitude or exaggerate the consequences of the
problem for his well-being to the extent that he is rendered helpless to
proceed. He may experience debilitating anger, fear, or grief. The
individual may even ascribe the disappearance to an irrational source
(i.e., the spirit of my deceased grandmother must have taken the car to
exact revenge for neglecting her in the years before her death). Most
people probably fall somewhere in between these two extremes. It
should be evident from this example, though, that an individual with
an extremely negative problem orientation - if general in nature -
would not only find himself incapable of addressing the problem of his
missing car, but would also be unable to make the myriad decisions
260 See D'Zurilla et al., supra note 47, at 15.
261 See id.; Nezu & Nezu, Problem Solving Therapy, supra note 252, at 188.
262 See Nezu & Nezu, Problem Solving Therapy, supra note 252, at 188.
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called for at a criminal trial if unrepresented. The following
subsections consider the four skills identified by social problem-
solving theory as necessary for effective problem solving.
B. Problem Solving
The second domain of social problem solving involves the rational
application of four problem-solving skills, designed to maximize the
probability of identifying an effective solution to a problem.263 Once a
person has recognized the existence of a problem that he wishes to
address, he must perform a series of goal-directed tasks to reach an
effective solution.2 These tasks include (a) problem definition and
formulation, (b) generation of alternative solutions, (c)
decisionmaking, and (d) solution implementation and verification.2 65
The cognitive and behavioral activities associated with each of the four
problem-solving processes, as summarized by Professors Arthur M.
Nezu and Christine M. Nezu, are presented in Table 1. While serving
unique functions, the tasks are linked in the sense that the successful
completion of one step in the problem-solving process enables the
effective application of the next skill.266 Adaptive functioning is
associated with rational problem solving,267 a constructive problem-
solving style involving the rational, deliberate, and systematic
application of the four problem-solving skills. 2' These skills are
presented in a sequential fashion, but effective problem solving in
practice often involves continual and reciprocal movement between
tasks before an effective solution is implemented.269
263 See D'ZURILLA & NEZU, PROBLEM-SOLVING THERAPY, supra note 46, at 22.
264 See id.
265 See D'Zurilla et al., supra note 47, at 14.
266 See generally D'ZURILLA & NEZU, PROBLEM-SOLVING THERAPY, supra note 46, at 33
(discussing implications of well-defined problem and realistic goals for subsequent
stages of problem-solving process).
267 See D'Zurilla et al., supra note 47, at 15.
268 Id. For an extended exposition of these four skills, see D'ZuRiLLA & NEZU,
PROBLEM-SOLVING THERAPY, supra note 46, at 23-34.
269 See D'ZURILLA & NEZU, PROBLEM-SOLVING THERAPY, supra note 46, at 34; Nezu &
Nezu, Toward a Problem-Solving Formulation, supra note 251, at 40.
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Table 1. Activities Associated with Four Major Problem-Solving
Processes 27
0
PROBLEM DEFINITION AND FORMULATION
1. Gather all available facts about the problem.
2. Describe these facts in clear and unambiguous terms.
3. Differentiate between facts and assumptions.
4. Identify those factors that make the situation a problem.
5. Set a series of realistic problem-solving goals.
GENERATION OF ALTERNATIVES
1. Generate as many alternative solutions as possible.
2. Defer critical judgment.
3. Generate alternative strategies first, then think of as many
tactics for each strategy as possible.
DECISIONMAKING
1. Evaluate each alternative by rating (a) the likelihood that
the alternative, if implemented optimally, will achieve the
desired goals and (b) the value of the alternative in terms of
personal, social, long-term, and short-term consequences.
2. Choose the alternative(s) that have the highest utility.
SOLUTION IMPLEMENTATION AND VERIFICATION
1. Carry out the chosen plan.
2. Monitor the effects of the implemented solution.
3. Compare or match the predicted and actual effects.
4. Self-reinforce if the match is satisfactory; recycle through
the process if the match is unsatisfactory.
270 This table is taken, verbatim, from Nezu & Nezu, Toward a Problem-Solving
Formulation, supra note 251, at 54.
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1. Problem Definition and Formulation
The first stage of the problem-solving process is problem definition
and formulation. Problems in the real world are usually "messy,"
meaning that they are vague and associated with irrelevant cues,
inaccurate information, and unclear goals.271 To ultimately identify an
effective solution, social problem-solving theory holds that a person
must clarify the nature of a problem and identify realistic problem-
solving goals.2 72 An individual faced with a problem should gather task
and social-behavioral information associated with the perceived
imbalance between the demands posed by the problem and the
responses available to address the situation in a satisfactory manner.2 73
Task information refers to the demands associated with performing
various tasks necessary to function in particular societal roles (i.e.,
employee, parent, pro se defendant). 274 Social-behavioral information
refers to a problem solver's personal goals and expectancies and those
of others with whom he must interact in the problematic situation.
275
While gathering this information, a problem solver should translate
the ambiguous and unfamiliar informational context of the problem
into more specific or familiar terms. 276 He should differentiate between
relevant and irrelevant information and distinguish between facts and
21
assumptions. 7 A problem solver should use gathered information to
comprehend the nature of the problem by identifying which
conditions are unacceptable, what changes are desired, and (ideally)
which obstacles, such as informational deficit, ability deficit, or
uncertainty, prevent him from meeting the demands. 278 A problem
271 See D'ZURILLA & NEZU, PROBLEM-SOLVING THERAPY, supra note 46, at 23.
272 See D'Zurilla et al., supra note 47, at 16; D'Zurilla & Nezu, Development and
Preliminary Evaluation, supra note 254, at 157. An early description of the problem
definition and formulation stage included these operations: (a) describing available
facts in clear, concrete terms, (b) separating relevant from irrelevant information and
facts from assumptions, (c) identifying problem-solving goals, and (d) identifying
obstacles, conflicts, or demands that make the situation problematic. See Arthur Nezu
& Thomas J. D'Zurilla, Effects of Problem Definition and Formulation on the Generation
of Alternatives in the Social Problem-Solving Process, 5 COGNITIVE THERAPY & RES. 265,
265-66 (1981). For an extended discussion of this element, see D'ZURILLA & NEZU,
PROBLEM-SOLVING THERAPY, supra note 46, at 23-28.
273 D'ZURILLA & NEZU, PROBLEM-SOLVING THERAPY, supra note 46, at 23.
274 Id.
275 Id.
276 Id.
277 See Nezu & Nezu, Toward a Problem-Solving Formulation, supra note 251, at 48.
278 D'ZURILLA & NEZU, PROBLEM-SOLVING THERAPY, supra note 46, at 24.
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solver should articulate realistic or attainable goals in specific terms.
After he has clarified the problem and specified his goals for resolving
it, he should reappraise the significance of the problem for his
personal well-being.' ° During this stage of the problem-solving
process, an individual will find it useful to generate alternative
problem formulations because the way a problem is stated will affect
problem-solving outcomes.2 Negative problem orientation, subjective
biases, and distortions in problem attribution and information
processing may reduce an individual's effectiveness at this stage of the
problem-solving process.
28 2
For our friend with the missing car, problem definition and
formulation will involve gathering information to help him frame and
define his problem. Let us assume that all signs point to the fact that
someone took his car during the night. Investigation reveals that he
was not parked in an illegal parking spot and that, without a history of
prior unpaid tickets (of which he has none), the city would not have
towed his car anyway. He still has his car keys, so he knows the car
was not taken by using his keys. A call to his neighbor, the only other
person with keys to his car, reveals that she did not take the car and
her set of keys is in her possession. Thus, our friend believes his car
was hotwired. At this point, he could define his problem as his car
having been stolen. This definition would suggest the goal of locating
his car. More pressing, however, may be the individual's need to travel
to work. He therefore might define his problem as not having a means
of transportation to reach his office. In this case, he might identify his
goal as finding a way to arrive at work on time.
2. Generation of Alternative Solutions
After an individual clarifies the nature of the problem and his
personal goals for resolving the situation, he should generate
alternative solutions. Social problem-solving theory posits that
brainstorming as many potential solutions as possible will maximize
279 Id. at 25.
280 Id. at 25-26.
281 Id. at 26. Alternative formulations may reveal that the initially identified
problem stems from an antecedent problem or is part of a broader problem, either of
which may be more important to recognize. Id. at 27. Research demonstrates that a
well-defined problem usually will have a positive impact on the generation of relevant
solutions, improve the effectiveness of the decisionmaking process, and enhance the
accuracy of solution verification. See Nezu & Nezu, Toward a Problem-Solving
Formulation, supra note 251, at 47.
282 See D'ZuiuI_ & NEZU, PROBLEM-SOLVING THERAPY, supra note 46, at 23-24.
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the likelihood that the best possible solution will surface.283 To
accomplish this goal, D'Zurilla and Goldfried stressed three principles:
quantity, deferment of judgment, and strategic variety.2" The first
principle is that quantity breeds quality, meaning that an individual
will identify more high quality ideas as he generates additional
alternatives. 285 Deferment of judgment refers to the notion that an
individual will produce a greater number of high quality ideas when
he defers critical evaluation of alternatives until the decisionmaking
stage, when he will compare alternatives and select the solution most
likely to achieve his goals.286 Ideas that are irrelevant to the problem
should be discarded. 287 Finally, the principle of strategic variety
suggests that an individual should generate strategies for solving a
problem before brainstorming specific actions or tactics for
accomplishing each strategy.28
Going back to our example, assume that the problem-plagued
individual articulates his problem as lacking a means of transportation
to get to work. His goal is to find a way to arrive at work on time. The
individual may brainstorm the following options: he could walk to
work, take a bus, call a friend for a ride, or contact a taxi. If he is
creative, and if his work permits, he may consider calling his boss and
seeking permission to work from home. Each alternative is relevant to
his problem and defined goal. Because our fictitious friend is an ideal
problem solver, he defers judgment on, and elaboration of, each option
283 See id. at 28-29; D'Zurilla & Nezu, Development and Preliminary Evaluation,
supra note 254, at 157; D'Zurilla et al., supra note 47, at 16; Nezu & Nezu, Problem
Solving Therapy, supra note 252, at 189. The conceptualization of this skill derives
from divergent production operation, a facet of Joy Paul Guilford's Structure-of-
Intellect Problem Solving model. See D'ZURILLA & NEZU, PROBLEM-SOLVING THERAPY,
supra note 46, at 28 (citing J.P. GUILFORD, THE NATURE OF HUMAN INTELLIGENCE
(McGraw-Hill 1967)).
284 See Thomas J. D'Zurilla & Arthur Nezu, A Study of the Generation-of-Alternatives
Process in Social Problem Solving, 4 COGNITIVE THERAPY & RES. 67, 68 (1980)
[hereinafter D'Zurilla & Nezu, A Study of the Generation-of-Alternatives Process].
D'Zurilla and his colleagues derived these principles from J.P. Guilford's divergent
production operation and Alex Osborn's method of brainstorming. D'ZURILLA & NEzU,
PROBLEM-SOLVING THERAPY, supra note 46, at 28 (citing J.P. GUILFORD, THE NATURE OF
HUMAN INTELLIGENCE (McGraw-Hill 1967) and A. OSBORN, APPLIED IMAGINATION:
PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES OF CREATIVE PROBLEM SOLVING (3d ed. 1963)).
285 D'ZURILLA & NEZU, PROBLEM-SOLVING THERAPY, supra note 46, at 28.
.86 Id.
11 See Nezu & Nezu, Toward a Problem-Solving Formulation, supra note 251, at 48.
' See D'Zurilla & Nezu, A Study of the Generation-of-Alternatives Process, supra
note 284, at 67-68. D'Zurilla and Nezu referred to this principle as "strategy." Id.
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until his brainstorm is finished. Brainstorm complete, he must now
assess his options and select the one most likely to solve his problem.
3. Decisionmaking
The third stage of the problem-solving process, decisionmaking,
involves evaluating and comparing the costs and benefits of different
solutions in order to select the solution most likely to achieve one's
goals.28 9 The decisionmaking component of the D'Zurilla and
Goldfried model is based upon expected utility theory, in which the
expected utility of a given alternative is a function of the value and
likelihood of predicted consequences.2 9° Inherent in decisionmaking
are causal and consequential thinking, i.e., identifying cause-effect
relationships and anticipating the consequences of one's actions.2 91
Selection of the best solution depends upon an individual's identifying
the likely benefits and costs associated with a certain alternative,
assigning a value or measure of personal importance to each
consequence, and estimating the probability that each consequence
will occur if he implements that alternative.2 92
Personal, social, short-term, and long-term consequences should be
considered in the decisionmaking stage.293 Personal consequences
include the time and efforts necessary to implement a particular
alternative and the consistency of the alternative with one's ethical and
moral standards.29 4 Social consequences may include effects on a
problem solver's family, friends, or community. 295 It is important that
a problem solver evaluate whether an alternative can be implemented
in its optimal form, given his practical limitations or skill deficits.296
After identifying the value and likelihood of consequences associated
with each alternative, a problem solver judges the utility of each
option, compares them, and selects the solution with the best expected
"8 See D'Zurilla et al., supra note 47, at 16; Nezu & Nezu, Problem Solving Therapy,
supra note 252, at 189. For an extended discussion of decisionmaking, see D'ZURILLA
& NEZU, PROBLEM-SOLVING THERAPY, supra note 46, at 29-31.
290 See Arthur Nezu & Thomas J. D'Zurilla, An Experimental Evaluation of the
Decision-Making Process in Social Problem Solving, 3 COGNITIVE THERAPY & RES. 269,
270 (1979) (citing C. W. CHURCHMAN, PREDICTION AND OPTIMAL DECISIONS (Prentice-
Hall 1961) and Edwards et al., Emerging Technologies for Making Decisions, in NEw
DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGY II (T.M. Newcomb ed., Hold, Rinehart & Winston 1965)).
291 See Nezu & Nezu, Toward a Problem-Solving Formulation, supra note 251, at 49.
292 D'ZURILLA & NEZU, PROBLEM-SOLVING THERAPY, supra note 46, at 29-30.
293 See Nezu & Nezu, Toward a Problem-Solving Formulation, supra note 251, at 50.
294 See id.
295 Id.
296 See id.
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utility. 97  D'Zurilla and Nezu acknowledged that rational
decisionmakers will vary in their evaluation of alternatives due to
differences in personal values, norms, tolerances, and commitments. 98
Returning to our hypothetical, the carless individual's
decisionmaking process will involve generating a list of advantages
and disadvantages associated with each brainstormed option. He may
note, for instance, that walking to work would leave him sweaty and
forty-five minutes late for a scheduled meeting. The bus, while
economical, carries similar disadvantages, because the nearest bus stop
is over a mile from his office. Calling a friend for a ride offers a unique
advantage: reaching out for help would allow him to express
vulnerability and thus might deepen their personal relationship. He
knows of one friend who lives nearby; upon reflection, however, he
realizes that she might have children, so she may be busy dropping
them off at school. Calling a taxi would be the most expensive option
but would likely result in his arriving at work before his meeting.
Asking to work from home carries the disadvantage of possibly
irritating his boss and - if permission were granted - not attending
the scheduled meeting in person. If he were able to work from home
successfully, however, this experience conceivably could pave the way
for his being allowed to work from home periodically in the future.
Having identified benefits and concerns associated with each option,
the problem solver would then assign a value and probability of
occurrence to each potential consequence. Let us assume the following
reasoning process. The individual quickly decides that walking or
taking the bus would almost definitely result in his arriving to work
sweaty and late and that both conditions are unacceptable. He realizes
that he does not have enough money for a taxi, so he rejects that
alternative. Given what he knows of his boss and her preferences, he
estimates that there is around a 50 percent chance that his boss will
allow him to work from home. He assigns a high value to missing the
meeting, but estimates a likelihood of approximately 40 percent that
his boss will allow him to participate by phone, which would be
acceptable to him. He believes that he has a roughly 90 percent chance
of meeting his work responsibilities from home and that, by doing so,
there would be a more or less 20 percent likelihood that he would be
permitted to work from home again in the future. He assigns a high
value to this opportunity. The problem solver believes there is only a
small chance of around 5 percent that his request would annoy his
boss, and he thinks that, if he did annoy her, the permanent damage
297 D'ZURILLA & NEZU, PROBLEM-SOLVING THERAPY, supra note 46, at 30.
298 Id. at 31.
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would be slight. (The individual would perform a similar analysis for
the option of calling a friend for a ride.) Having weighed all his
options, he decides to ask his boss if he may work from home.
4. Solution Implementation and Verification
After an individual selects what he considers to be his best option,
he then must implement the solution and ascertain its effectiveness for
solving his problem. Social problem-solving theory defines solution
implementation and verification, the final problem-solving step, as
carrying out a chosen solution, monitoring its consequences, and
evaluating its effectiveness.299  Solution implementation requires
performance skills that may differ from those skills necessary for
effective problem solving.3 °° For instance, a person may possess intact
decisionmaking powers but lack an ability to implement a chosen
solution due to anxiety, emotional distress, or deficits of technical or
social skills.30 1
The conceptual framework for solution verification derives from
control theory and the cognitive-behavioral conception of self-
control.3 2 Control theory focuses on the negative feedback loop, or
those actions taken to reduce the discrepancy between anticipated and
actual task performance.3 3 The cognitive-behavioral conception of
self-control includes self-monitoring, self-evaluation, and self-
reinforcement.3° Monitoring involves measuring the effects of an
implemented solution.305 Self-evaluation requires comparing the actual
to the anticipated outcome, as envisioned at the problem definition
and formulation stage.306 Self-reinforcement involves acknowledging a
job well-done, so long as the congruence between anticipated and
299 See D'ZURILLA & NEZU, PROBLEM-SOLVING THERAPY, supra note 46, at 31-34;
D'Zurilla & Nezu, Development and Preliminary Evaluation, supra note 254, at 157;
Nezu & Nezu, Problem Solving Therapy, supra note 252, at 189.
300 D'ZURILLA & NEZU, PROBLEM-SOLVING THERAPY, supra note 46, at 32.
301 Id.
302 Id.
303 Id. (citing C.S. Carver & M.F. Scheier, Control Theory: A Useful Conceptual
Framework for Personality-Social, Clinical, and Health Psychology, 92 PSYCHOL. BULL.
111 (1982) and G.A. MILLER ET AL., PLANS AND THE STRUCTURE OF BEHAVIOR (Holt,
Rinehart & Winston 1960)).
4 Id. at 32-33 (citing A. Bandura, Vicarious and Self-Reinforcement Process, in THE
NATURE OF REINFORCEMENT (R. Glasner ed., 1971) and F.H. Kanfer, Self-Regulation:
Research, Issues, and Speculations, in BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION IN CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY
(Appleton Century-Crofts 1970)).
"o See Nezu & Nezu, Toward a Problem-Solving Formulation, supra note 251, at 52.
306 See id.
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actual performance is satisfactory.3 °7  If the discrepancy is
unsatisfactory, then an individual must identify the source of the
difficulty and attempt to remediate the situation.0 8 Effective problem
solvers may return to the problem-solving process to find a better
solution or refine problem-solving goals when an initial outcome is
unsatisfactory.3"
Concluding our hypothetical, assume our friend calls his boss and
asks to work from home. She seems slightly annoyed but agrees to his
proposal and allows him to participate in the meeting by phone. He
performs satisfactorily from home, but no one seems to notice.
Nevertheless judging the resolution of his problem largely a success,
the problem solver vows to try working from home again in the future
and, next time, to supplement his effort by distributing some sort of
stellar work product so that others will notice his efficiency and level
of engagement.
Social problem-solving theory offers insight into cognitive,
behavioral, and affective abilities necessary for effective, rational
decisionmaking. To determine which, if any, components of problem
solving to include in a representational competence standard, we must
develop a normative lens and then subject each problem-solving
ability to scrutiny through this lens.
V. APPLYING PROBLEM-SOLVING THEORY TO REPRESENTATIONAL
COMPETENCE
Social problem-solving theory suggests a range of decisionmaking
abilities requisite to reaching sound, autonomous decisions. A subset
of these abilities may be crucial enough to self-representation to
warrant inclusion in a representational competence standard. To
evaluate the importance of each ability, we must develop and apply a
normative theory of representational competence. Reasons of sound
public policy - in addition to the Court's guidance in Edwards -
suggest that representational competence exists to preserve and
effectuate the autonomy of the criminal defendant while protecting, to
some minimal degree, the reliability and actual and apparent fairness
of the proceeding. Thus, this Article proposes that a court should
307 D'ZuRiuA & NEzU, PROBLEM-SOLVING THERAPY, supra note 46, at 33.
308 Id.
309 See D'Zurilla et al., supra note 47, at 17.
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allow a defendant capable of autonomous decisionmaking at trial to
control his defense unless the self-representation poses a grave threat
to the reliability or fairness of the adjudication. Application of this
theory distills certain abilities that should be included in a
representational competence construct. Future work will provide a
detailed exploration of the applicability of problem-solving theory for
self-representation."'
A. Normative Theory of Representational Competence
As commentators have observed, courts and scholars should derive
the abilities necessary for decisionmaking worthy of judicial deference,
and therefore included within a test of competence, from a normative
conception of the purposes that the competency standard serves.311 To
arrive at a normatively appropriate competency standard, we must
identify and evaluate the values implicated by self-representation and
then use these values to assess the importance of various decisional
abilities. Self-representation by a marginally competent defendant
recognizes and promotes the autonomy of the defendant while
potentially impairing the reliability of the adjudication, the actual and
apparent fairness of the proceeding, and the perceived legitimacy of
the criminal justice process.312 Refinement of the competence standard
will reflect a balancing of these values and interests. Normative
considerations will also affect the threshold required for each
functional ability within the context of a particular case and the level
of incongruence that courts will tolerate between a defendant's ability
310 For extended treatment of the applicability of problem-solving theory to self-
representation, see Johnston, supra note 43, at 17-63.
311 See, e.g., Bonnie, A Theoretical Reformulation, supra note 26, at 298 ("Which
abilities should be regarded as necessary for legally valid decision-making, and
therefore included within a 'test' of decisional competence, must be derived from a
normative conception of client autonomy in criminal defense."); Bruce J. Winick, The
Side Effects of Incompetency Labeling and the Implications for Mental Health Law, 1
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 6, 31 (1995) ("A competency evaluation . . . inevitably
involves subjective cultural, social, political, and legal judgments that are essentially
normative in nature. The decision regarding which standard of competency should be
used turns on moral, political, and legal judgments concerning the appropriate level of
ability that individuals must possess to exercise a variety of liberty and property
interests.").
312 See Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 2387 (2008) (discussing impact of
marginally competent defendant's self-representation on his dignity, objective of
providing fair trial, reliability of adjudication, and appearance of fairness to
observers).
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and that arguably required by the defendant's situation before ordering
intervention by the State.313
At base, self-representation recognizes the autonomy of the
defendant." 4 In the words of Justice Scalia, the right to control one's
defense embraces "the supreme human dignity of being master of
one's fate rather than a ward of the State - the dignity of individual
choice."31 5 While Faretta derived a right to self-representation from
our nation's history and the text of the Sixth Amendment,
31 6
subsequent courts have emphasized the central role of autonomy to
the self-representation right.317 To borrow a term from philosopher
Stanley I. Benn, autonomy is the "telos," or animating factor, of the
right to self-representation.318
In finding a constitutional right to self-representation, the Faretta
Court articulated three independent aspects of autonomy. First, the
Court stressed "the inestimable worth of free choice. '319 Allowing a
defendant to control his defense honors the dignity and individualism
of the defendant.32° Because a defendant will suffer the consequences
of a conviction, he must be free to decide whether representation is to
his advantage. 321 This choice, while often misguided, "must be
honored out of 'that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of
the law.' ,322
313 See GRISSO, supra note 126, at 32-36 (defining interactive component of
competency standards).
314 See Martinez v. California, 528 U.S. 152, 160 (2000); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465
U.S. 168, 176-77 (1984) ("The right to appear pro se exists to affirm the dignity and
autonomy of the accused and to allow the presentation of what may, at least
occasionally, be the accused's best possible defense."); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S.
806, 834 (1975).
315 Edwards, 128 S. Ct. at 2393 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
316 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 818.
311 See, e.g., Bribiesca v. Galaza, 215 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 2000) ("At its heart,
the rule expounded by the Supreme Court in Faretta is a rule protecting individual
autonomy.").
318 Benn defined the "telos" of a right as "whatever it is for the sake of which the
right exists, that gives point to ascribing it." Stanley I. Benn, Human Rights - For
Whom and for What?, in HUMAN RIGHTS 59, 62 (E. Kamenka & A. Tay eds., 1978).
319 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834.
320 See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 176-77 (1984) ("The right to appear
pro se exists to affirm the dignity and autonomy of the accused and to allow the
presentation of what may, at least occasionally, be the accused's best possible defense.
. . . In determining whether a defendant's Faretta rights have been respected, the
primary focus must be on whether the defendant had a fair chance to present his case
in his own way.").
321 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 819, 834.
322 Id. at 834 (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350-51 (1970) (Brennan, J.,
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Second, Faretta recognized that allowing a defendant to control his
defense is critical to "the substance of an accused's position before the
law. '323 In essence, the Court honored a defendant's ability to respond
to the prosecution on his own terms, in his own way. The Court
rejected the coercive power of the government to haul a person into
court, force a state-funded lawyer upon him, and authorize that lawyer
to override the strategic and tactical positions of the defendant.324
Indeed, self-representation is the means of last resort for a defendant
wanting to make strategic or tactical decisions with which his attorney
disagrees. When a defendant is represented, his counsel holds the
authority to make binding decisions of strategy and tactics.325 In cases
recognizing this authority, courts stress that, if a defendant believes it
critical to proceed in a manner contrary to that chosen by his attorney,
he can always release his attorney and proceed pro se. 1 6 A pro se
defendant, on the other hand, has no other options. If a court
overrides his desire to control his defense, the defendant has no
recourse and must relinquish control over his preferred means of
defense against the government. 7
Third, effectuating a defendant's rejection of counsel is a necessary
correlate of the agency relationship that binds client to counsel.
Familiar black letter law holds that an agent does not have the
authority to bind the principal unless the principal implicitly or
explicitly consents to the contours of the representation. 31 In this
vein, the Court in Faretta explained the traditional allocation of most
concurring)).
323 Id. at 815 (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279
(1942)). Relatedly, the Court found that the right to control his defense personally
belongs to the defendant, not to the State or society. The Court interpreted the Sixth
Amendment as "not provid[ingl merely that a defense shall be made for the accused; it
grants to the accused personally the right to make his defense." See id. at 819.
324 See id. at 807, 820, 833, 834.
325 See Gonzales v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 1765, 1769-70 (2008). Under current
case law, a defendant can control the strategy and tactics of his case only when he
forgoes assistance of counsel. See id.; Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983).
Otherwise, counsel has the authority to select, over a defendant's objection, which
witnesses to call, which witnesses to cross-examine, what evidence to admit, and other
"tactical" decisions, including possibly which defense to exert. See Gonzales, 128 S.
Ct. at 1769-70.
326 SeeJones, 463 U.S. at 751 (explaining that defendant only has authority to make
"certain fundamental decisions," and suggesting that, if he wants additional control,
he could "elect to act as his or her own advocate").
327 Many, but not all, courts have recognized a defendant's right to decide whether
or not to raise an insanity defense. See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, MINDINGJUSTICE 211-12
(2006).
328 See 3 AM. JUR. 2D Agency § 270 (2009).
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trial decisions to counsel as premised on "the defendant's consent, at
the outset, to accept counsel as his representative."329 By definition, if
a defendant withholds consent, then his attorney lacks the authority to
speak for him.33°
As discussed previously, the Edwards Court premised its holding
that the Constitution permits a trial court to impose a more stringent
standard for self-representation than to stand trial partly on concerns
about accuracy, fairness, and the legitimacy of the criminal justice
system to outside observers. 3 ' However, given the history of the right
to self-representation and the Court's articulation of the right at its
genesis in Faretta, these values appear less fundamental than respect
for a defendant's autonomy. Courts recognizing a right to self-
representation consistently have acknowledged that judgments in
cases involving pro se defendants are less likely to be accurate or
reliable than when a defendant is represented by counsel.332 The U.S.
Supreme Court has long recognized that, without counsel's assistance,
a defendant may be convicted on an invalid indictment or
incompetent evidence.333 In other words, though he has a perfect
defense, a pro se defendant may be found guilty because he lacks the
skills and knowledge necessary to prepare and present it.334 It is hard
to fathom additional factors beyond those explicitly anticipated by the
Court, except perhaps a complete lack of motivation to contest the
State's charges, that could lead to an inaccurate verdict. In addition,
the fact that self-representation typically requires judicial and societal
329 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 820-21.
330 See Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 2394 (2008) (Scalia, J. dissenting);
Gonzales, 128 S. Ct. at 1773 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that "action taken by
counsel over his client's objection . . . would have the effect of revoking the agency
with respect to the action in question"). Cf. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626,
633-34 (1962) ("Petitioner voluntarily chose this attorney as his representative in the
action, and he cannot now avoid the consequences of the acts or omissions of this
freely selected agent. Any other notion would be wholly inconsistent with our system
of representative litigation, in which each party is deemed bound by the acts of his
lawyer-agent and is considered to have notice of all facts, notice of which can be
charged upon the attorney." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
331 See Edwards, 128 S. Ct. at 2387.
332 In Faretta, the Court concluded that "[ilt is undeniable that in most criminal
prosecutions defendants could better defend with counsel's guidance than by their
own unskilled efforts." Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834. See also Flanagan v. United States,
465 U.S. 259, 268 (1984) (stating that "the [Faretta] right reflects constitutional
protection of the defendant's free choice independent of concern for the objective
fairness of the proceeding"); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 176 n.7 (1984).
"I Faretta, 422 U.S. at 833 n.43.
334 Id.
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tolerance for some degree of indecorum weakens the absolute value of
maintaining the appearance of fairness.335
A range of normative standards exists that would accommodate the
recognition that a defendant's autonomy should receive more weight
than the interests of reliability, actual fairness to the defendant, and the
appearance of fairness to the outside world.3 36 A court could deny self-
representation, for example, only to prevent a wrongful conviction or a
substantial miscarriage of justice.337 This strikes me as too stringent a
standard and insufficiently protective of the government's interest in
the fairness and outward legitimacy of the criminal justice process. It is
not difficult to imagine a situation, for instance, where the public
assumes a defendant's guilt, but condemns a conviction because the
court did not treat the defendant fairly or the adversarial process
appeared to be a sham. At the other end of the spectrum, a court could
allow self-representation so long as it would not present any threat to
the reliability or fairness of the adjudication or otherwise call into
331 See John F. Decker, The Sixth Amendment Right to Shoot Oneself in the Foot: An
Assessment of the Guarantee of Self-Representation Twenty Years After Faretta, 6 SETON
HALL CONST. L.J. 483, 487 (1996) ("[MIost pro se defendant cases disrupt the criminal
justice system to some degree.").
336 Slobogin and Mashburn have argued that "[slocietal interests regarding
reliability and process should play no role in determining when a person has the
capacity to make a decision about his or her rights or prerogatives." Slobogin &
Mashburn, supra note 36, at 1597. Instead, "[o]nly autonomy interests ... should be
relevant in determining the content of the decisional competency standard, at least
with respect to the decision[] . . . to waive the right to counsel." Id.; see also id. at
1591-92 (arguing that competency to waive counsel should not take into account
defendant's ability to represent himself). Slobogin and Mashbur argued in particular
that concerns about reliability "should not affect the predicate determination of
decisional competence." Id. at 1601. However, Slobogin and Mashburn advocated for
overriding a defendant's autonomous choices when reliability concerns are
particularly compelling. See id. at 1585, 1601.
"I "Miscarriage of justice," while a legal term of art, does not have a settled
definition in the law. See Kent Roach & Gary Trotter, Miscarriages of Justice in the War
Against Terror, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 967, 972-73, 1032-40 (2005) (arguing that post-
September 11 experience suggests that traditional conception of miscarriage of justice
should be extended beyond field of wrongful criminal convictions to include
detention of individuals who do not satisfy definition of inadmissible and removable
"terrorist" aliens in immigration law or of enemy combatants in military orders);
Jordan Steiker, Innocence and Federal Habeas, 41 UCLA L. REv. 303, 341-42 (1993)
(examining Supreme Court's "unexamined, indeed concealed, infidelity to current and
past understandings of 'miscarriage of justice' "). See also Michael Naughton,
Redefining Miscarriages of Justice, 45 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 165 (2005); Stephanie
Roberts & Lynne Weathered, Assisting the Factually Innocent: The Contradictions and
Compatibility of Innocence Projects and the Criminal Cases Review Commission, 29
OXFORDJ. LEGAL STUD. 43, 49-50 (2009).
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question the legitimacy of the proceeding. Or, a court could deny self-
representation "in the interests of justice." These standards seem
insufficiently deferential of autonomy and too amenable to abuse by
judges looking to avoid the substantial inconvenience of managing
unrepresented defendants at trial. Because self-representation is often
harmful to a defendant's case, to some extent every instance of self-
representation at trial could pose a threat to the reliability of the
proceeding.
Though perhaps not perfect, I suggest that a court should allow a
defendant capable of autonomous decisionmaking at trial to control
his defense unless the self-representation poses a grave threat to the
reliability or fairness of the adjudication. The standard recognizes that
autonomy and a preference for self-determination lie at the heart of
the right to self-representation, but allows a court to override a
defendant's autonomy when faced with a serious threat to the actual
fairness, apparent fairness, or reliability of the proceeding. This
standard would be sufficiently deferential of autonomy, while
accommodating the U.S. Supreme Court's concerns regarding fairness
and reliability in Edwards. Assuming it withstands scrutiny by courts
and commentators,338 this normative framework should guide the
evaluation of functional abilities for inclusion in a representational
competence standard.
Defendants incapable of autonomous decisionmaking, however, do
not possess a cognizable autonomy interest.339 As John Stuart Mill
38 Some may ask whether the severity of the punishment should influence the
application of this standard. The language of the test affords some flexibility in this
regard. For instance, in recognition of the government's heightened interest in
ensuring the reliability and apparent fairness of a capital case, a court could find that
even a small risk of an erroneous imposition of the death penalty would constitute a
"grave" threat to the legitimacy of the process. Frankly, I am uncomfortable with the
idea of a court's according more or less weight to a defendant's autonomy interest
based on the severity of the penalty. If a defendant is capable of meaningful autonomy
- and if a substantial threat does not exist to the reliability or fairness of the
proceeding - then a defendant should be permitted to exercise his constitutional
right to control his defense, no matter the penalty faced by the defendant. A
defendant's right to express his autonomy and control his fate is just as strong when
facing death as when facing a one-year prison sentence. In fact, the severity of a
potential penalty may incentivize a defendant to consider his options more carefully.
When he reaches a decision that would conflict with the one appointed counsel would
impose, the decision is likely to be the product of strongly held beliefs, values, and
priorities and thus be of greater autonomous value.
311 Slobogin and Mashburn have described the relationship between incompetence
and autonomy in this way:
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expressed, it is error to formulate principles "as universal rules for
attaining a given end... without regard to the possibility.., that
some modifying cause may prevent the attainment of the given end by
the means which the rule prescribes. '' 340 Faretta rested on a conception
of an autonomous individual as capable of identifying his own
interests, evaluating a situation in light of those interests, and making
an informed, rational decision to advance those interests. 341 Persons
who are incapable, because of a mental illness or defect, of identifying
and protecting their interests are incapable of exercising meaningful
Society values autonomy because we assume people are ordinarily the best
judges of their own interests and because, even if they are not, taking away
their opportunity to decide would show insufficient respect for the person.
Because of this preference for autonomy, we generally allow individuals
considerable latitude when engaging in behavior that is not directly harmful
to others. When a person appears to lack autonomy, however, either because
of externally imposed coercion or - most relevant in the present context -
'internal' causes, society is less likely to respect his or her choices, even if
they affect no one else. Because such people are deemed unable to function
or to make decisions in their own best interests, society is more willing to
override their decisions even if doing so will make them feel degraded or
minimized. At the least, the state's parens patriae power - its power to act as
parent for disabled citizens - authorizes interference with an incompetent
person when harm to self would otherwise result and the intervention will
not itself cause harm. Beyond this, the state may even have an affirmative
duty to intervene under such circumstances.
Slobogin & Mashburn, supra note 36, at 1586-87.
340 Fred D'Agostino, Mill, Paternalism and Psychiatry, 60 AUSTRALASIANJ. PHIL. 319,
322 (1982) (quoting John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive, in
8 COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL 946 (.M. Robson ed., Univ. of Toronto
Press 1974 (1843))). Even Mill, one of the staunchest opponents of paternalism by the
state, recognized that his harm principle - the principle that "the sole end for which
mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of
action of any of their number, is self-protection" and "to prevent harm to others,"
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in 18 COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL 213, 223
(J.M. Robson ed., Univ. of Toronto Press 1977 (1859)) - applies only "to human
beings in the maturity of their faculties." Id. at 224. Thus, paternalism might be
warranted for children, the "delirious," or others without "the full use of the reflecting
faculty." See D'Agostino, supra, at 321 (quoting Mill, On Liberty, in 18 COLLECTED
WORKS OFJOHN STUART MILL, supra, at 223).
14' The Faretta Court expressed that the right to self-representation should serve as
a conduit for a defendant's exercise of "his informed free will." Faretta v. California,
422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975). The Court also stressed the defendant's right to elect,
"intelligently," to control his defense. Id. at 807; see Erica J. Hashimoto, Defending the
Right of Self-Representation: An Empirical Look at the Pro Se Felony Defendant, 85 N.C.
L. REV. 423, 456 (2007) ("Imbedded within this notion of autonomy and free choice
[in Faretta] . . . is the idea that the decision to proceed pro se is going to be made
freely, i.e., without a cloud of mental illness.").
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autonomy.34 2 Preventing these persons from representing themselves is
not violative of autonomy and is a reasonable application of the
government's parens patriae power, through which the government
protects those who cannot care for themselves.343
By recognizing that certain capacities are requisite to the existence
of autonomy, our normative theory leads to the preliminary
conclusion that representational competence should only include a
particular decisional ability when one of two criteria is met. First,
representational competence should encompass those functional
abilities necessarily present for the exercise of meaningful autonomy.
Second, representational competence should require a functional
ability if its absence poses a grave threat to the reliability or the actual
or apparent fairness of the adjudication. Decisional abilities crucial to
reliability and fairness likely will be those at the heart of adversarial
testing.344
It is important to emphasize that research findings should validate
any proposed representational competence standard before adoption
by a court. A court should not require a pro se defendant to possess
any cognitive or behavioral ability unless empirical evidence
demonstrates that incompetent defendants actually differ from
competent defendants along those dimensions.345  In addition,
342 See King, supra note 36, at 211 ("In cases involving criminal defendants
suffering serious mental impairment, the very reasoning behind the model of client-
centered representation and client autonomy can fall apart, especially in cases
involving defendants who, although competent to stand trial, are 'decisionally
incompetent' and, therefore, unable meaningfully to assist in their own defenses.");
Slobogin & Mashburn, supra note 36, at 1586.
343 See Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 373 (1986); H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398,
449 n.46 (1981).
34 Interpreting the Sixth Amendment, the Supreme Court has defined a fair trial as
"one in which evidence subject to adversarial testing is presented to an impartial
tribunal for resolution of issues defined in advance of the proceeding." Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984). 1 do not consider the suggestion that a pro se
defendant should possess decisional abilities sufficient to allow him to engage in a
minimal degree of adversarial testing to contradict Faretta's mandate that "a defendant
need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order competently and
intelligently to choose self-representation." Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835. For an
c L .... 7.. t- rPnrpzpntational comnetence comports with the
dictates of Faretta, see supra notes 341-43 and accompanying text.
11 See Bonnie, Beyond Dusky and Drope, supra note 26, at 579 (stating that data
regarding distribution of abilities relating to "rational decisionmaking" in general
population of criminal defendants, and regarding relation between these abilities and
mental disorder, should be used to determine competency standards for varying
decisional contexts when defendant disagrees with his attorney, but that systematic
research on these issues had only recently begun); cf Anderer, supra note 208, at 39,
73 (making this point in context of guardianship proceedings).
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empirical evidence should prove that those differences create an
unacceptable risk of unreliability or unfairness as a general matter.346
Caution is especially appropriate when considering the inclusion of
decisionmaking abilities because research demonstrates that the
average person (much less the average criminal defendant seeking to
proceed pro se) may not employ optimal decisionmaking strategies.347
Empirical evidence should also demonstrate whether a potentially
incompetent defendant seeking to proceed pro se differs from the
majority of pro se criminal defendants in his capacity to make
decisions, how he differs, and whether those differences are of a kind
and magnitude justifying intervention.348
In sum, normative considerations should guide the selection of
abilities, drawn from problem-solving theory, for inclusion in a
representational competence standard. In general, abilities should only
be required if they are essential to the exercise of autonomy, the
reliability of the adjudication, or the actual or apparent fairness of the
proceeding. While a detailed exploration of the importance of each
problem-solving ability is provided elsewhere,349 some tentative
observations about the importance of certain abilities for self-
representation at trial are appropriate at this juncture.
346 Cf. Anderer, supra note 208, at 39, 73.
317 See Barry Edelstein, Challenges in the Assessment of Decision-Making Capacity, 14
J. AGING STUD. 423, 428 (2000) (describing research indicating that many individuals
do not engage in formal rational manipulation of information presented in
decisionmaking evaluations); Arthur M. Nezu & Christine M. Nezu, Clinical
Prediction, Judgment, and Decision Making: An Overview, in CLINICAL DECISION MAKING
IN BEHAVIOR THERAPY: A PROBLEM-SOLVING PERSPECTIVE 9, 18-19 (Arthur M. Nezu &
Christine M. Nezu eds., 1989) [hereinafter Nezu & Nezu, Clinical Prediction]; Amos
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185
SCI. 1124 (1974) (establishing widespread use of heuristics, or mental shortcuts, in
making decisions); see also Maroney, supra note 129, at 1397, 1427 (describing
individuals' common reliance on cognitive heuristics and biases and suggesting
"flexible reasoning" as more appropriate model for real-world decisionmaking); Saks,
supra note 20, at 958 ("Even generally effective decisionmakers who clearly have the
ability to form accurate beliefs misuse statistics, misunderstand probabilities, and
accord undue weight to vivid examples. They also may be affected profoundly by
irrational and unconscious factors.").
348 Cf. Anderer, supra note 208, at 39 (making this point in context of competence
for guardianship).
14 See Johnston, supra note 43, at 17-63.
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B. Problem-Solving Abilities Potentially Necessary for Self-
Representation
Social problem-solving theory is useful in highlighting motivational
and decisional abilities necessary for optimal decisionmaking.
Analyzing each ability through our normative lens, it is possible to
identify capacities critical to the existence of autonomous
decisionmaking, the reliability of the adjudication, or the actual or
apparent fairness of the proceeding. While a detailed analysis of each
problem-solving ability is beyond the scope of this Article,35 ° I offer a
preliminary analysis of the importance of three abilities: a willingness
to address a problematic situation, an ability to gather information to
define a problem, and abilities necessary to make (and, to some
degree, execute) decisions within the hurly-burly of a criminal trial.
1. Problem Orientation: Willingness to Attend to Problems
An orientation to attend to problems is critical to a reliable and fair
conviction. Remember that problem orientation, as defined by
D'Zurilla and Nezu, is a motivational process that involves the
cognitive, affective, and behavioral response of an individual when
confronted with a problematic situation.3 51 The behavioral element of
problem orientation involves an individual's tendencies to confront or
avoid problems,35 2 while the affective component consists of his
emotional response to problematic situations.35 3 In order to ensure, at
a minimal level, the reliability and apparent fairness of a conviction
following trial, a defendant must not be unwilling (due to mental
illness or another mental condition) or unable (due, for instance, to
disabling emotions) to address and attend to the problem that the
prosecution presents.354 In essence, this element of positive problem
350 For a comprehensive analysis of the importance of each problem-solving ability
for self-representation, see id.
311 See Nezu & Nezu, Problem Solving Therapy, supra note 252, at 188.
352 See D'Zurilla & Nezu, Development and Preliminary Evaluation, supra note 254,
at 157.
353 See id. For a compelling exploration of emotion's role in problem perception
and appraisal, see Maroney, supra note 129, at 1404-05; id. at 1404 (arguing that
emotion "affects the perceived value, personal relevance, or attractiveness of the
information being processed, and therefore will shape motivation and goals").
354 Several commentators have opined on the importance of motivation to
competence. See Altman et al., supra note 223, at 1686 (highlighting importance of
motivation in psychological literature and suggesting that competency should take
into account a person's lack of motivation to participate meaningfully in medical care
decisions); Ian Freckelton, Rationality and Flexibility in Assessment of Fitness to Stand
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orientation indicates an individual's desire to engage in a problem-
solving process and not to abdicate his autonomy to the wishes of the
prosecution.355
An unwillingness to contest charges because of depression or
another disabling mental condition may not constitute a valid
expression of autonomy,356 poses a severe threat to the reliability of a
conviction, and undermines the proceeding's apparent fairness. A
familiar example of a defendant unwilling to attend to the problem of
the prosecution is Richard Moran, the defendant in the U.S. Supreme
Court case of Godinez v. Moran.357 Moran was charged with three
counts of capital murder.35 8 Originally, he pleaded not guilty with the
assistance of counsel. 359 Two psychiatrists appointed to assess his
competency observed that, while he was competent to stand trial,
Moran was "very depressed" and that, "because he is expressing and
feeling considerable remorse and guilt, [he] may be inclined to exert
less effort towards his own defense." 31 Several months later, Moran
discharged his attorneys and pleaded guilty to three counts of capital
murder.16' He explained that he wished to represent himself "because
he opposed all efforts to mount a defense" and wanted to prevent the
presentation of all mitigating evidence at the capital sentencing
proceeding.362 Moran later testified that, at the time, "I guess I really
didn't care about anything .... I wasn't very concerned about
anything that was going on ... as far as the proceedings and
everything were going." '363 After waiving his right to counsel, Moran
presented no defense, called no witness, and offered no mitigating
evidence on his own behalf.36' He was sentenced to death.365 In
Trial, 19 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 39, 53 (1996); Maroney, supra note 129, at 1404,
1409-11, 1413-15 (discussing importance of emotion to motivation in context of
adjudicative competency). Slobogin and Mashburn have proposed a test for decisional
competence that includes a volitional element, coined "basic self-regard." See Slobogin
& Mashburn, supra note 36, at 1598. "Basic self-regard" is defined as "a willingness to
exercise autonomy." See SLOBOGIN, supra note 327, at 195.
'5' See Slobogin & Mashburn, supra note 36, at 1608-09 (arguing that defendant's
abdication of autonomy by refusing to evaluate unfavorable evidence violates principle
of "basic self-regard" and should result in finding of incompetence to proceed pro se).
356 See id. at 1607-08.
357 509 U.S. 389 (1993).
3 See id. at 391.
See id. at 409 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
31 See id. at 410.
361 See id.
362 See id.
363 See id. at 410-11.
364 Id. at 412.
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essence, this "self-destructive" orientation left Moran, in the words of
Justice Blackmun, "helpless to defend himself," '366 and he "volunteered
himself for execution."367 Godinez demonstrated that, to safeguard the
reliability and apparent fairness of a criminal trial, courts should not
allow a defendant to represent himself if he, because of a mental
illness or disability, has a negative problem orientation and lacks a
willingness to challenge the government's case.
2. Problem Definition: Gathering Information
One prerequisite to the exercise of meaningful autonomy - as well
as to a minimal degree of reliability - is an ability to gather
information to define the contours and implications of a decision. As
defined by D'Zurilla and Nezu, problem definition and formulation
involves gathering relevant information about a problematic situation
and using it to comprehend the nature of the problem and formulate
realistic goals.366 The ability to define and advance one's interests in a
given situation depends upon the ability to understand why and how a
situation is problematic. If a defendant lacks a basic ability to
comprehend a problematic situation and understand the way it may
affect his interests, then he necessarily is incapable of defining and
advancing his interests in response to that problem.369 In this respect,
he is incapable of exercising meaningful autonomy.
365 See id. at 393 (majority opinion).
366 See id. at 417 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
367 See id. at 416.
36 See D'ZURILLA & NEZU, PROBLEM-SOLVING THERAPY, supra note 46, at 23.
369 In some ways, the capacities inherent in problem definition are extensions or
heightened forms of the abilities necessary to stand trial with counsel. Dusky
established that to be competent to stand trial, a defendant must have "a rational as
well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him" and "sufficient present
ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding."
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam); see also Drope v.
Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975). Bonnie has interpreted the Dusky standard to
require an understanding of the nature and purpose of the criminal prosecution, a
capacity to understand the criminal charges, and a capacity to recognize and relate
relevant information to counsel concerning the facts of his case. See Bonnie, Beyond
Dusky and Drope, supra note 26, at 551-52, 561. These abilities were operationalized
in the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool - Criminal Adjudication, or
MacCAT-CA, to include an understanding of the adversary nature of the proceeding,
the basic roles of participants, and the possible consequences of conviction
("understanding"); the ability to recognize and relate information relevant to
constructing a legal defense ("reasoning"); and the holding of plausible beliefs about
how participants and procedures will play out in one's case ("appreciation").
POYTHRESS ET AL., supra note 109, at 60. The cognitive abilities to recognize the
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Moreover, when a defendant rejects counsel's assistance and chooses
to proceed to trial, the reliability of the judicial outcome will depend
on the defendant's ability to analyze and understand the prosecution's
case. To understand the "problem" of the prosecution's case, a
defendant must be capable of comprehending the elements of the
offense, gathering information on the government's likely prosecution
theory, following the introduction of evidence at trial, and assessing
the legal significance of that evidence.37 ° A defendant's inability to
gather and comprehend this information would be fatal to his attempt
to function as the government's adversary, even to a minimal degree.
3. Solution Implementation
Certain elements of solution implementation may be necessary to
ensure that a proceeding satisfies basic guarantees of fairness and
reliability. Solution implementation involves performing or carrying
out a chosen solution in a particular context.371 This problem-solving
stage requires skills of execution that may differ from those skills
necessary to reach a satisfactory decision in the abstract.372 For
instance, a person may possess intact decisionmaking powers, but lack
the ability to implement a chosen solution due to deficiencies in social
skills, lack of relevant technical skill, anxiety, or emotional distress.
373
As a preliminary point, Faretta emphasized that a defendant need not
perform well at trial - indeed, all members of the U.S. Supreme Court
indicated their expectation that a defendant would fare poorly.374
relevance of information, understand one's legal situation, and appreciate one's
jeopardy are similar to the abilities to gather relevant information on a nebulous
problem, evaluate that information, and understand how the information (and,
relatedly, the broader problem) affects one's interests. Often the "problem" in self-
representation, however, will not be defined for the defendant, so he will need to
engage in an active information-gathering and evaluative process in order to discern
the problem's contours and scope. In practical terms, it will be far easier for an
individual to hold a rudimentary understanding of the nature of the proceeding and
the possible consequences of a conviction - after these have been explained to him
by an attorney - and to identify relevant legal information - after having been
prompted by an attorney - than to perform similar functions without assistance.
370 Professors Leonard L. Riskin and Nancy A. Welsh have defined the way parties
typically conceptualize the "problem" in civil litigation as the applicable law, the legally
relevant facts, and how they mesh. See Riskin & Welsh, supra note 237, at 867-68.
371 See D'ZURILLA & NEZU, PROBLEM-SOLVING THERAPY, supra note 46, at 31-34;
D'Zurilla & Nezu, Development and Preliminary Evaluation, supra note 254, at 157;
Nezu & Nezu, Problem Solving Therapy, supra note 252, at 189.
372 See D'ZURILLA & NEZU, PROBLEM-SOLVING THERAPY, supra note 46, at 32.
171 See id.
374 See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 833-34 & n.43 (1975) (majority
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Mandating that a pro se defendant possess strong performance and
implementation skills before allowing him to control his defense also
trivializes the importance of autonomy to the self-representation right.
Some aspects of solution implementation may be necessary,
however, to ensure that a proceeding is reliable and fair and appears
fair to outside observers. For instance, a pro se defendant should
possess the capacity to sustain decisional competence from moment to
moment within the context of trial. Making decisions within a hectic
trial environment requires the abilities to maintain concentration or
attention, sustain mental coherence, make decisions within a short
timeframe, and withstand the stress likely to accompany trial
participation.375  In addition, a defendant should be able to
communicate his decisions to a functionary of the court. To satisfy the
Dusky standard to stand trial, a defendant must be able to
communicate pertinent information to counsel and express a
preference as to fundamental decisions within his decisional
domain.376 Bonnie included these abilities in his foundational
competence to assist counsel standard. 377 Self-representation may,
depending on the level of support a court provides to a defendant,
require communicative abilities of a different degree. For instance, if a
court fails to appoint standby counsel, a pro se defendant must be able
to communicate with a judge, witnesses, and potentially a jury. These
individuals will not assist the defendant in articulating a decision or
encourage him with a sympathetic ear. The abilities to maintain
concentration, sustain mental coherence, make decisions in a short
timeframe, withstand the stress of trial, and communicate to
functionaries of the court - all critical to a defendant's capacity to
make decisions in the real-life setting of a criminal trial and to execute
them to a minimal degree - are crucial to reliability, the actual and
apparent fairness of the proceeding, and the legitimacy of the criminal
justice system.
opinion); id. at 838-39 (Burger, J., dissenting).
"I The Edwards Court alluded to some of these elements. The Court listed some
conditions that "impair the defendant's ability to play the significantly expanded role
required for self-representation," including deficits in sustaining attention and
concentration and anxiety. Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 2387 (2008) (quoting
Brief for the American Psychiatric Association et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Neither Party at 26, Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379 (No. 07-208), 2008 WL 405546).
376 See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam); see also
Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975).
37 See Bonnie, Beyond Dusky and Drope, supra note 26, at 561. The MacCAT-CA
operationalized this capacity as a "reasoning" ability to recognize and relate information
relevant to constructing a legal defense. POYTHRESS ETAL., supra note 109, at 60.
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Applying our normative theory of representational competence, it is
possible to identify a subset of problem-solving abilities potentially
necessary for self-representation at trial. These capacities include the
willingness to address a problematic situation, the ability to gather
information to define a problem, and the abilities necessary to make
(and, to some degree, execute) decisions within the real-life context of
a criminal trial. While some of these capabilities are extensions of
those necessary to assist counsel, others are not addressed in Bonnie's
adjudicative competence construct. Requiring the possession of these
abilities and attributes prior to permitting a defendant to represent
himself at trial should advance the values of autonomy, reliability, and
fairness.
CONCLUSION
In June 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court in Edwards held that the Sixth
Amendment permits a trial court to impose a higher competency
standard for self-representation than to stand trial. It left to lower
courts the task of generating a constitutionally permissible standard,
but indicated that a defendant's decisionmaking abilities may be an
important element of competence to proceed pro se at trial. Until now,
models of decisional competence for self-representation have included
the construct proposed by Professor Bonnie and other tests derived
from his framework. While Bonnie's construct may provide an
appropriate standard for evaluating the competence of represented
defendants' decisions, it is at most a starting point for identifying the
abilities needed for self-representation at trial. In particular, self-
representation involves a decisionmaking context much more
demanding than that faced by represented defendants.
This Article looks to social problem-solving theory to illuminate
abilities requisite to autonomous decisionmaking. Applying a
normative theory of representational competence that balances
concerns of autonomy, reliability, and fairness, the Article suggests a
subset of abilities that may be critical for self-representation at trial.
Potential capabilities include a willingness to address a problematic
situation, an ability to gather information to define a problem, and the
abilities necessary to make and, to some degree, execute decisions
within the real-life context of a criminal trial. Future work will explore
the relationship between additional problem-solving abilities and
representational competence.
Let us return to the Moussaoui case. Does it appear that Moussaoui
possessed the problem-solving abilities identified here as important to
representational competence? It seems likely that, for the most part,
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he did. Moussaoui certainly was willing to attend to the problem of
the prosecution and wanted to challenge the prosecution's case.3 78 He
asserted his innocence,379 filed numerous motions in his defense,8 °
and prevailed initially in his arguments that the trial court should
exclude evidence linking him to the September 11 attacks and prohibit
the government from seeking the death penalty. 38' He also seemed
capable of gathering information to define the contours of a problem.
Take, for instance, the "problem" or decision point of whether to
accept representation by counsel. Moussaoui appears to have
questioned his appointed counsel thoroughly about their willingness
378 See John Rosenthal, Doing Justice to Zacarias Moussaoui, 146 POL'Y REv. 39, 39
(Dec. 2007 & Jan. 2008) (quoting Transcript of Jury Trial, United States v.
Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263 (4th Cir. 2010) (No. 01-455-A): "and I will testify of the
entire truth. Nobody can not say now that they don't know that I want to testify. I will
take the stand, and I will say the truth that I know."); "I Can't Wait for the Jury":
Moussaoui, Citing Koran, Demands to Proceed Without Appointed Counsel, LEGAL TIMES,
Apr. 29, 2002, at 15 ("In the name of Allah, I, Zacarias Moussaoui, today the 22nd of
April, 2002, after being prevented for a long time to mount an effective defense by
overly restrictive and oppressive condition of confinement, take the control of my
defense by entering a pro se defense set for presentation in order to mount a
significant defense of the life that Allah, the most masterful, has granted to me.").
379 "I Can't Wait for the Jury," supra note 378, at 15 ("I'm innocent until proven
guilty, OK, so even if the government have blocked my money, I believe that they
have no right and this should be fought in court.").
380 In regards to the seemingly bizarre nature of some of his pretrial motions,
Moussaoui himself repudiated such motions, calling them merely "propaganda": "I
knew that my pleadings were being put on the Internet.... I carry on my propaganda
war." Rosenthal, supra note 378, at 42. As John Rosenthal has argued, due in part to
Judge Brinkema's ruling prohibiting the broadcast of court proceedings and the
unexpected consequence that electronic transcripts were only made available at a
price, "the part of the record of the Moussaoui case that is readily accessible to the
public is disastrously skewed." Id. at 41.
Courtesy of the court, the bizarre ramblings in Moussaoui's pretrial motions
have been freely available on the Internet for over five years now, during
which time they have irrigated the fevered mental landscapes in which anti-
American phantasms prosper the world over. On the other hand, and also
courtesy of the court, Moussaoui's remarkably lucid and coherent testimony
has, for all intents and purposes, been as inaccessible to the public as it
would have been had Moussaoui testified before the Star Chamber.
Id. at 41-42.
"' See Jerry Markon, Dismissal of Terror Charges Appealed; Federal Judge Barred
Sept. 11 Evidence, Death Penalty in Moussaoui Case, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 2003, at A2.
This ruling was reversed, allowing the government to seek the death penalty. Jerry
Markon, Prosecutors Want Moussaoui Trial in October, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 2005, at
A2. For a discussion of Moussaoui's success in presenting an adequate defense, see
Allen, supra note 12, at 1556.
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to follow his wishes on matters of strategy and defense.382 Concluding
that self-representation was necessary in order to present a defense
consistent with his priorities and religious beliefs, he dismissed his
attorneys.383  Moussaoui also was, to some extent, capable of
communicating with the court to execute his decisions. While some of
his exhortations were rambling and sermon-like and earned censure
from the court, 34 he ultimately appeared able to communicate his
382 Moussaoui recounted his experience with appointed counsel in this manner:
So the first encounter was with [Gerald] Zerkin. Lawyer Zerkin, after not
even a week, we have a very direct discussion where I said to him that if he
doesn't want to adapt, to follow the guidance of my defense the way I want,
according to my principle, my belief, my understanding, and my religion,
OK, he have to make a professional judgment and withdraw from the case.
He say he can't .... So at first, [attorney Edward] MacMahon have a very
relaxed attitude. He say, "This is your defense, Mr. Moussaoui. We are here
to help you, OK, and we will do as you wish. You want to do this according
to Islam principle," so on and so forth, OK. Nice talk. The same for Mr.
[Frankl Dunham. But on January 30, the last day of the month, I believe,
after like something of great importance, we have an argument, a divergence
of opinion about a tactical point, OK, and Frank send them, MacMahon and
Zerkin, to visit me, OK, to clarify a situation. When they came, they didn't
discuss the point they were supposed to discuss. They wanted to assert their
right as a lawyer to define the strategy and the tactic on the defense of my
life .... [B]ecause before in a sense, I always told whatever I disagree with.
They say, "From now on, finished. We are going to do as we wish." I say,
"This is my life, and you have not any understanding of the situation. You
have no information. You have nothing from the FBI. You have nothing, and
you want to be in charge." He says, "We are the lawyer, and we are, by
statute or whatever, we are in charge." So I say, "So are you sure?" So I asked
them three time, because this is the manner of the Muslim, to assert
something, we used to - we ask three time the same question. And if he
respond three time, it means that it's OK now. So they say, "Yes. Indeed, we
will just inform you when we believe that it's important." OK. So I say, "If
it's like that, I dismiss you. You are not my lawyer anymore."
"I Can't Wait for the Jury," supra note 378, at 15.
383 See id. Moussaoui also seemed fundamentally to distrust any attorney appointed
by a government with which he was at war. See Rosenthal, supra note 378, at 57
(observing that, while "Moussaoui laid out numerous particular grounds for accusing
the court-appointed defense lawyers of what he styled 'criminal non-assistance,' . . .
the fundamental fact of his being at war with the United States was, as he made
unmistakably clear, the single overriding reason for his refusing their
representation"). Another possible motive for wanting to fire his court-appointed
counsel, as Moussaoui's appellate brief stated, was that "his lawyers had to
consistently tell [Moussaoui] they were unable to share crucial [classified] evidence
with him, and these circumstances irreparably damaged the attorney-client
relationship." Adam Liptak, The Right to Counsel, in the Right Situations, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 26, 2008, at All.
4 See Cameron Stracher, Eyes Tied Shut: Litigating for Access Under CIPA in the
1672 [Vol. 43:1605
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points effectively.3 85 There is little evidence that Moussaoui was unable
to make decisions within a reasonable time or otherwise to withstand
the stress of trial. Moussaoui may have been incapable - or at least
unwilling - to maintain appropriate courtroom demeanor, however.
In fact, it was partially on this basis that Judge Brinkema found that
Moussaoui had forfeited his right to represent himself and ordered his
standby counsel to once again serve as attorneys of record.
38 6
Given these abilities, but lapses in courtroom behavior, was
Moussaoui "simply crazy," as his defense attorneys insinuated, 8 7 or
was such a characterization "cheap," since "[biroadly speaking for the
American people anybody who fly a plane into a building is somebody
who is crazy," as Moussaoui "noted dryly"?388 We may never truly
know. But perhaps one just way to evaluate the competency of a
borderline criminal defendant who wants to represent himself at trial
would be to evaluate his ability to, on his own terms, analyze and
solve the problem of the prosecution.
Government's "War on Terror," 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 173, 177 (2003) (quoting district
court order characterizing Moussauoi's motions as containing "extensive
inappropriate rhetoric" and "replete with irrelevant, inflammatory and insulting
rhetoric").
385 See Rosenthal, supra note 378, at 53 (quoting Judge Brinkema from Trial
Transcript, United States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263 (4th Cir. 2010) (No. 01-455-A)
as saying, "He has actually a better understanding of the legal system than some
lawyers I've seen in court"); "I Can't Wait for the Jury," supra note 378, at 15.
Rosenthal has noted that while Moussaoui's court-appointed lawyers appeared to want
to "confuse" members of the jury with numerous "theories," most of which attempted
to "demean or discredit the defendant," "Moussaoui was proposing, in effect, to
educate them: to offer them a unique insider's view of the 9/11 plot." Rosenthal, supra
note 378, at 53.
386 See Jerry Markon, Court Reins in Terror Suspect; Moussaoui Ordered to Use
Attorneys, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2003, at B3; Markon, supra note 13, at A7. In Illinois
v. Allen, the Supreme Court held that a defendant whose speech or conduct "is so
noisy, disorderly, and disruptive that it is exceedingly difficult or wholly impossible to
carry on the trial" may forfeit his right to be present at trial, even when he is
proceeding pro se. 397 U.S. 337, 338 (1970).
37 Rosenthal, supra note 378, at 53.
388 Id.
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